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Pharmaceuticals  is  a  large,  high-growth,  globalised,  and  innovation  intensive 
industry.  Its products- drugs- are directed to satisfy consumer needs in an area-
health care - which is vital for society.  Health care and therapeutics are among the 
most relevant issues in  the definition of the concepts of welfare and democracy in 
the  new Century. Thus, the pharmaceutical industry is  clearly a "strategic" sector 
for Europe. 
Ever  since  the  XIX  Century,  pharmaceuticals  has  been  a  stronghold  of the 
European  industry,  and  it  still  provides  by  far  the  largest  contribution  to  the 
European trade balance in high-technology, R&D intensive sectors. 
However, it is now a diffused perception that the European pharmaceutical industry 
is losing ground vis-:i-vis the United States. 
Against  this  background,  the  Report  examines  the  competitive  position  of the 
European pharmaceutical  companies  and  industries,  and  compares  them  with  the 
pharmaceutical  companies and  industries  in  other parts of the  world,  particularly 
the US. 
Over the  last two decades, the  industry has experienced some important structural 
changes, mainly driven by technological and institutional shocks that have affected 
all  the  stages  of its  value  chain.  In  tum,  this  has  led  to  changes  in  firms' 
organisation  and  in  market  structure,  within  domestic  markets,  regionally,  and 
globally. 
On the one hand, the life sciences have transformed the prospects and the processes 
of drug discovery and development.  On the other hand, the rise of healthcare and 
prescription  drug  spending  has  induced  cost  containment  policies,  which  have 
affected  the  structure  of demand  in  all  the  major  national  markets.  In  addition, 
increasingly stringent requirements for the approval of new drugs, together with the 
orientation  of research  towards  increasingly  complex  pathologies,  have  implied 
2 larger,  more  costly  and  internationally  based  clinical  trials.  Developments  in 
legislation and  in  courts'  interpretation  of issues  concerning  intellectual  property 
rights,  as  well  as  the  increasing  openness  of  domestic  markets  to  foreign 
competition, have influenced patterns of industrial competition and the evolution of 
industry structure. 
Jointly, these tendencies have implied a sharp increase  in  the resources needed to 
develop new drugs. Equally important, they have led to a redefinition of the nature 
and  the  complementarities  between  the  fundamental  sources  of  competitive 
advantages in this industry, namely R&D and innovative competencies, marketing 
and distribution capabilities. 
The pharmaceutical industry today has  to be understood as a system or network. 
Innovative activities, as welll as production and commercialisation of  drugs, rest on 
and involve, either directly or indirectly, a large variety of actors: different types of 
firms, other research organisations like universities and public and private research 
centers,  financial  institutions,  regulatory  authorities,  governments,  health  care 
systems,  consumers,  physicians,  etc.  These  actors  are  linked  together  through  a 
web  of different  relationships,  which  include  almost  pure  market  transactions, 
"command  and  control"  administrative  rules,  competition,  collaboration,  and  all 
sorts of  "intermediate forms". 
This  suggests  that  the  competitiveness  of the  industry  cannot  be  assessed  by 
looking  only  at  the  individual  firms,  but  also  at  the  broader  set  of institutions, 
infrastructures,  and policies  that  influence  the  actions  of companies,  and - even 
more important - at the dynamic interactions between these levels of  analysis. 
The picture is further complicated by the fact that the industry is populated by very 
different  firms.  In  the  first  place,  there  are  the  multinational  companies,  which 
cover between  40  to  60%  of most  national  markets  in  the  advanced  countries. 
These are fairly global firms.  Although they do keep a good share of activities and 
sales  in  their  own  domestic,  or  at  least  continental  markets,  these  companies 
operate  across  national  or  even  continental  borders,  and  they  set  divisions  and 
3 activities  in  other countries  and  regions  as  well.  Often,  their property  is  spread 
across different countries, particularly Europe and the US.  These are highly R&D-
intensive  companies  with  large  sunk  costs  both  in  R&D  and  in  marketing  and 
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distribution assets. 
The  industry  is  populated by two  other types  of firms.  First,  there  are  smaller 
companies which  are  specialised  in  the  sales  of non  R&D-intensive  drugs.  They 
conduct mainly manufacturing  and  commercialisation activities,  and  do  not invest 
in R&D.  These are typically national companies which operate almost exclusively 
in their own markets.  Since the past twenty years or so, another set of companies 
have  populated this  industry,  notably  the  research  intensive  companies  that  have 
sprung  off from  the  new  opportunities  opened  up  by the  life  sciences - the  so-
called New Biotechnology Firms (NBFs).  These companies are  specialised in the 
new  biotechnologies,  and  their  activities  range  from  the  discovery  and 
development of new drug  compounds to the development of new drug screening or 
research tools and technologies in fields like genomics, bioinformatics, etc. 
Measuring competitiveness is  always a difficult exercise, given the ambiguity with 
which this  concept is  sometimes used and the  different possible interpretation that 
can be found  in  the  literature.  As a consequence, and given the  complexity of the 
pharmaceutical  industry  in  its  relationships  with  the  research,  regulatory  and 
healthcare  systems,  we  introduce here  a set of differentiated indicators,  including 
various measures of value added, productivity, trade balance, world market shares 
and,  above  all,  innovativeness.  Jointly,  these  measures  provide  a  fairly  coherent 
and  consistent  indication  about  the  dynamics  of  competitiveness  and  its 
determinants. 
I 
Manufacturing is not that important in this industry compared to R&D and commercialisation, which 
command the bulk of  the investments. 
4 The  main  finding  of the  Report  is  that  indeed  the  European  industry  has  been 
losing  competitiveness  as  compared  to  the  USA,  although  there  are  large 
differences  and trends  across  European  countries.  As  a whole,  Europe  is  lagging 
behind in its ability to generate, organise, and sustain innovation processes that are 
increasingly expensive  and  organisationally complex.  More  specifically,  the  main 
results of  the Report can be summarised as follows. 
A.  First,  using  Eurostat  data  we  document  that  the  European  pharmaceutical 
industry is  more labour intensive than the US  or the Japanese industries.  We find 
that the share of labour costs on the value of production in Europe is higher than in 
the US  and Japan.  The difference is  sufficiently high to suggest that it cannot just 
stem from higher charges on labour costs in Europe. Moreover, the share of value 
added net of labour costs on total production value is much higher for the US  and 
Japan.  The  US  and  Japanese  industries  rely  more  than  Europe  on  "non-labour" 
inputs, such as capital or most likely R&D. The overall share of total value added 
on production value in the US and Japan is also higher than in Europe. 
All these  factors  combined suggest that not only is  the  European industry labour 
intensive,  but that  the  higher labour intensity is  also  associated with  lower value 
added activities. While there are differences across European countries, our results 
are  not  inconsistent  with  the  view  that  in  the  European  pharmaceutical  industry 
there is a less pronounced specialisation in R&D activities, and that there is a larger 
presence of  non R&D-intensive firms which conduct fairly mundane activities. 
We also find that while the European industry grew faster than the US and Japan in 
the  1980s, in the  1990s it has grown less than the US  industry. This stems from a 
deceleration of the growth of the industry in Europe, and an acceleration of the US 
industry  growth.  We  also  employ  traditional  growth  accounting  techniques  to 
Eurostat  country  level  data  to  decompose  the  growth of the  industry  in  the  US, 
Japan,  and  the  EU-15  countries.  While  employment  growth  has  practically  no 
contribution to the growth of production value in pharmaceuticals, we fmd that in 
the  US  (and  Japan)  the  growth of the  industry  stems  to  a good  extent  from  the 
5 growth of its non-labour inputs. By contrast, these inputs contribute modestly to the 
growth of the  industry  in  Europe,  whose  growth  is  accounted  for  largely by the 
unexplained residuals - viz.  by factors  that  are  independent of the growth of the 
measurable inputs. 
One  may  be  tempted  to  attribute  this  result  to  some  form  of  unobserved 
technological change or externality.  In fact,  most of the technical change in  this 
industry comes from specific investments in R&D, which are captured by the non-
labour  inputs  in  the  value  added  figures  for  the  industry.  As  a  result,  our 
interpretation about the weight of the residual in the European drug sector growth 
is that the growth of the industry in Europe is likely to depend to a good extent on 
factors other than R&D, capital or labour.  Not only is this saying that the growth 
of the industry in Europe is more "erratic" than in the US or Japan, but also that the 
growth in capital or R&D translates less markedly into sales growth.  The empirical 
evidences produced in Section V of this Report show that this is not independent of 
the effects of the regulatory regimes on industry structure, with the larger presence, 
in  Europe, of firms  and activities which are  less  dependent  on internal  R&D  and 
innovation,  and  more  on  external  inputs,  such  as  licenses  from  international 
companies, pricing policies, or peculiarities of the public regulatory and health care 
systems or demand in individual European countries, etc. 
B.  Second,  the  Report  focuses  on  the  competitiveness  of  the  European 
multinational corporations, particularly in comparisons with the  US  firms.  These 
firms  compete  largely  on  new  drug  products  based  on  substantial  R&D 
investments.  An  important  question  is  therefore  whether  the  innovation- and 
R&D-based competitiveness of the European multinationals has worsened vis-fl-vis 
their  US  or  Japanese  competitors.  Our  data  indicate  that  the  sales  of major 
innovative  products  by the  US  multinationals  have  increased  more  significantly 
than  those  of the  European  multinationals  in  the  1990s.  When  we  look  at  the 
number of the top selling new chemical entities (NCE) developed by the European 
and US  firms,  we find  that the number of NCE developed by companies of either 
6 regions  is  not  substantially  different.  This  suggests  that  the  European 
multinationals are facing a comparative disadvantage in selling their new drugs.  In 
fact,  the  US  pharmaceutical  market  has  grown  from  being  roughly  equal  to  the 
European market at the beginning of the  1990s to  almost twice  as  much in  very 
recent years.  In particular, the restructuring of pharmaceutical demand and of the 
health  care  system,  in  the  US,  has  translated  into  demand  growth  which  has 
benefited mainly the  US  firms.  In fact,  in spite of their multinational  nature,  the 
bulk of the sales of the US and European firms is  still in their own markets.  It is 
therefore  natural  that the US  firms  have taken greater advantage  of the  growing 
demand  in  their own  country.  Indeed,  we find  that  in  this  period the  European 
multinationals  as  well  have  increased  their  market  share  in  the  US  to  take 
advantage of this  opportunity.  However differences  in  terms of market sizes  and 
rates of growth does not rule out that differences in sales growth between European 
and  US  multinationals  depend  also  on  differences  in  the  ability  to  discover and 
develop new drugs. In particular, we find that: a)  in the  1990s US companies have 
gained a clear and growing leadership in terms of the sales generated by the New 
Chemical  Entities  (NCEs)  launched  on  the  market  place;  b)  the  portfolio  of 
products held by the European multinationals tends to be older than that of the US 
firms.  These  evidences  suggest  that  there  may  be  some  differences  in  research 
productivity in recent years as well. 
C.  Our third  conclusion  is  that  the  relative  position  of the  US  as  a  locus  of 
innovation  in  pharmaceuticals  has  increased  over  the  past  decade  compared  to 
Europe.  One notable difference between Europe and  the US  in  the  1990s is  that 
while the US  have continued the development of a new research-intensive industry 
in  the  life  sciences,  Europe  has  been  unable  to  complete  the  process  of vertical 
specialisation in the most innovative areas of the drug sector.  Particularly, Europe 
has  not  really  given  rise  to  a  full  fledged  industry  of  innovation  specialist 
companies and technology suppliers like in the US.  The US pioneered the rise of a 
new organisation of this industry, based on an effective division of labour between 
smaller  and  larger  companies  with  different  comparative  advantages  in  the 
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"exploration" and "exploitation" of new innovation opportunities.
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Since  the  very 
beginning of the new trend  in  the early  1980s,  Europe has been less  effective  in 
encouraging the growth of new technology suppliers and innovation specialists.  If 
anything, this is emphasised by the fact that the European drug multinationals have 
increasingly relied on sources of research capabilities and innovation located in the 
US,  thereby  reinforcing  the  difficulties  in  creating  a  European  industry  of 
technology  suppliers.  Likewise,  we  shall  see  in  this  Report  that  one  important 
development in  the  industry in recent years has been the growth of new tools  for 
drug  discovery  and  testing  (combinatorial  chemistry  techniques,  genomics, 
highthroughput screening etc.).  These tools can seriously enhance the efficiency of 
the research process in the industry.  So far,  however, the industry of new drug 
research tool  producers is  largely a  US  phenomenon.  In principle,  the  fact  that 
Europe  has  been  unable  to  give  rise  to  a  full  fledged  industry  of technology 
suppliers may not be considered as a critical problem for the competitiveness of the 
firms operating in the final markets.  Competitiveness in sales depends on different 
factors from competitivenss in innovation.  Moreover, in a globalised industry such 
as  pharmaceuticals, companies may not need local technology suppliers, provided 
that the drug producers can tap the new technology sources in other markets. The 
question, however, is whether European drug companies can tap such international 
sources  of technology.  While  this  may  not  be  a  problem  for  the  largest  drug 
multinationals, the ability to do so by the large fringe of companies that operate in 
several  European national markets is a totally different story.  There is  another, 
probably  more  important,  twist  to  this  issue.  More  than  being  critical  for  the 
growth of the downstream industry,  the  presence of a  local  industry of research-
based firms and technology suppliers is critical because the industry is, by itself, a 
powerful source of growth.  We shall note in the Report that the US biotechnology 
industry has given rise in the past two decades to a large number of new jobs, to at 
2 
See March, 1991. 
8 least a dozen new world-class drug companies (e.g. Amgen, Chiron, Genzyme, and 
others),  along  with  several  new  others  in  the  new  drug  tool  technologies  (e.g. 
Incyte,  Millennium),  and  it  has  produced  a  stream  of revenues  in  the  form  of 
royalties from licenses or R&D contracts and collaborations. 
D.  The fourth conclusion that we want to  highlight can be put very simply.  The 
national  European  markets,  especially  in  some  Countries,  are  not  competitive 
enough.  We show this by using data on the variation in prices and market shares 
after patents expire.  In some countries, which rely on administered prices, we find 
that prices  and market  shares do  not vary substantially after patents  expires.  In 
competitive  drug  markets,  price  drops  are  a  typical  consequence  of  patent 
expiration and of entry by generic products, with a significant turnover in terms of 
market  shares.  We  therefore  conclude  that  there  is  too  little  market-based 
competition  in  the  final  markets  in  some  of the  European  countries.  This  has 
contributed to nurture inefficient positions within the industry. 
All  in  all,  the  Report  claims  that  the  competitiveness  of  the  European 
pharmaceutical  industry  is  negatively  affected  by the  perstistence  of insufficient 
degrees of competition and  institutional  integration,  still  centred on domestic  and 
fragmented markets and research systems.  Four sets of variables are found  to be 
relevant as  sources of competitiveness and growth in pharmaceuticals:  1) The size 
and the structure of the biomedical education and research systems; 2) Some basic 
institutions governing labour markets for skilled researchers and managers, as well 
as corporate governance and finance; 3) Intellectual property rights and patent law; 
4) The nature and intensity of  competition on the final market. 
The Report is organised as follows.  In Sections II, III, and IV, a series of  measures 
and indicators of the performance of the industry are developed.  In section V  we 
show that competition is an important determinant of competitiveness .  In Section 
VI,  the  Report  illustrates  the  role  of some  institutional  variables.  Section  VII 
summarises our fmdings. 
9 The data analysed in this Report come from OECD, Eurostat, the European Patent 
Office,  IMS  Health,  and from  PHID  (PHarmaceutical  Industry  Database)  at  the 
University of Siena. The general approach is to combine two relevant perspectives 
in  the  analysis  of competitiveness.  On  the  one  hand,  the  IMS,  European  Patent 
Office,  and  PHID  data  sets  sustain a detailed analysis  of industry dynamics and 
firm-level strategies, by location of corporate headquarters.  On the other hand, the 
OECD  and  Eurostat  data  sets  show  production,  trade,  and  R&D  activities  by 
country, regardless of  the origin of  the companies (OECD, Eurostat). 
10 II.  Structural Indicators in the EU, USA, and Japan 
Total  ependiture  on  pharmaceuticals  represents  between  0.7  and  2.2%  of GDP 
across OECD countries, with a mean at around 1.2%
3
• Demand for pharmaceuticals 
is  highest in the  US,  Western Europe,  and  Japan.  Prescription drug  expenditures 
have grown significantly in the past 15 years (see Tables 1 and 2). First, data show 
the substiantial growth of the US  market during the Ninenties.  In particular, from 
1995 to  1999, the US  market had the  highest percent annual growth rates, coming 
to  account  for  approximately  40  percent  of the  total  world  market  for  ethical 
pharmaceuticals  in  1999.  Europe's  share  declined  to  less  than  27  percent,  while 
Japan's share  in  1999  was  nearly  16  percent.  In general,  total  drug  expenditures 
have been driven up  by the  introduction of new drug  therapies,  higher third-party 
coverage  of drugs,  the  substitution  of higher-priced  new  drugs  for  lower-priced-
existing  drugs,  and,  especially  in  the  US,  more  aggressive  marketing  by 
manufacturers through direct-to-consumer advertising
4
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Table 1: 
Size of  the Market in Pharmaceuticals, 1995-1999, US$ billion 
Markets  1985  1989  1990  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
-·  ·-·-·  ,_,, ___  ,,,  .... _,,,  ......... ----·  -- ----
World 
Regional Shares 
North America 
Europe 
A/AlA 
Latin America 
79.1 
% 
28.1 
22.0 
23.4 
5.6 
153.3 
% 
34.0 
31.0 
30.0 
5.0 
Source: IMS International 
3 
165.8 
% 
32.4 
26.5 
35.1 
5.9 
280.3 
% 
31.2 
29.6 
32.4 
6.8 
See Jacobzone, 2000; OECD Health Data, 2000. 
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GA0,2000. 
. '''  ....... 
290.8  296.1  304.7  337.2 
%  %  %  % 
33.0  35.9  38.1  40.2 
30.7  28.8  29.1  26.7 
29.2  27.5  25.0  26.4 
7.1  7.8  7.7  6.6 
11 Table 2: 
Largest Pharmaceutical Markets in the World, US$ million 
Rank 1999  Country  1989  1994  1999 
-- --- ---- -- ----- - - --- - -- - ---- ---------
Rank  USD  Rank  USD  Rank  USD 
USA  1  44789  1  75425  1  130069 
2  Japan  2  30229  2  52568  2  53548 
3  Germany  3  9984  4  16725  3  18500 
4  France  4  9326  3  15152  4  17751 
5  Italy  5  8260  5  8829  5  11332 
6  UK  6  4526  6  6821  6  11029 
7  Spain  8  3349  8  4710  7  6596 
17  Belgium  13  1219  15  2162  17  2703 
32  Russia  NA  NA  NA  NA  32  1033 
18  Netherlands*  15  1087  16  2078  18  2391 
19  Poland  NA  NA  27  1010  19  2260 
20  Sweden  18  902  20  1418  20  2102 
22  Switzerland  17  971  17  1619  22  1824 
24  Austria  21  779  22  1382  24  1781 
23  Portugal  24  667  23  1267  23  1805 
25  Greece  28  512  26  1182  25  1423 
31  Finland  25  579  33  715  31  1039 
34  Denmark  33  417  34  679  34  913 
40  Czech Republic  NA  NA  NA  477  40  748 
38  Norway  37  354  NA  514  38  816 
* 1998 data for the Netherlands is based on estimated sales only. 
The  pharmaceutical  industry  is  the  fifth  largest  industrial  sector  in  the  EU, 
amounting  to  3.5  per  cent  of the  total  manufacturing  production  (Eurostat). 
Moreover, the pharmaceutical sector provides a sizable, positive contribution to the 
EU trade balance (16,201  US$ million in 1998). As can be seen in Tables 3 and 4, 
the  EU as  a whole  is  a net  exporter of pharmaceutical products,  with  a positive 
12 trade  balance  throughout  the  last  decade.  Between  1985  and  1998,  the  EU 
pharmaceutical sector has shown good trade performance compared to the US and 
Japan,  with  a  trade  balance  that  continued to  rise.  Even  if the  share  of EU-15 
exports to the US has increased, the rest of the world remains the main destination. 
Conversely, US exports are directed in a much larger proportion towards developed 
5 
markets as compared to Europe . 
5 
One is to warn however that trade data in the drug sector may reflect decisions to locate production 
and marketing activities by pharmaceutical multinationals. 
13 Table 3: 
International trade of pharmaceutical products (US $ million) 
1985  I986  I987  1988  I989  I990  I99I  I992  I993  I994  I995  I996  1997  1998 
~~  ~·-~···~-¥~  .. -~--~~~ 
'"¥~?-Y-· 
EXPORTS FROM EU-I5 to: 
Intra-EU-I5  4458  6I06  7687  8991  9530  I2000  135II  I6643  16376  19043  23679  25700  26329  30726 
Switzerland & Norway  579  826  973  I069  1I40  I498  I675  2082  2420  2471  3262  3263  3492  3935 
Japan  407  640  889  1167  1177  1254  1449  1843  1906  2I25  2227  2035  2009  1702 
us  668  827  I006  II25  1246  1395  I710  219I  229I  2767  3636  4002  5282  78I5 
Rest of  the world  3458  4I90  4735  5228  5524  720I  78Il  8875  9756  I1016  1355I  I4725  I6I56  I7I75 
Total world exports  9570  I2589  15290  I7580  186I7  23347  26157  31634  32749  3742I  46355  49725  53268  61353 
Total extra-EU-I5 exports  5112  6483  7603  8589  9087  II348  12646  I499I  16373  I8378  22676  24025  26939  30627 
IMPORTS TO EU-I5 from: 
lntra-EU-I5  4517  6254  7806  9209  9989  I2965  I4928  I7722  I7I2I  20023  25307  2635I  27I27  3I490 
Extra-EU-15  2197  2916  3513  403I  4434  5663  6400  7706  8059  8719  10961  12344  I2472  14426 
Total world imports  6714  9170  113I9  13240  14423  18628  21328  25428  25I80  28742  36268  38695  39599  45916 
PHARMAC. TRADE BALANCE 
Extra EU-I5  29I5  3567  4090  4558  4653  5685  6246  7285  8314  9659  11715  11681  14467  I6201 
Extra-EU-15  Export/Import  2.33  2.22  2.I6  2.13  2.05  2.00  1.98  1.94  2.03  2.II  2.07  1.95  2.I6  2.12 
ratio 
EXPORTS FROM US to: 
EU-15  1I62  I448  I459  I855  1686  1858  2070  2441  2508  2564  2811  3300  3819  4635 
Switzerland & Norway  78  92  100  145  81  96  94  150  185  400  230  186"  187  437 
Japan  571  634  686  793  785  764  810  817  849  836  933  846  852  881 
Rest of the world  979  I039  1I03  I297  II08  1385  I635  I949  2204  2292  2459  2828  3I79  3708 
T  otai world exports  2790  3214  3348  4089  3660  4I03  4609  5357  5747  6092  6433  7I60  8037  966I 
IMPORTS TO THE US 
Total world import  I7I8  2084  2498  3235  2II7  2540  3092  386I  4I98  4755  5605  7I50  8737  I0982 
PHARMAC. TRADE BALANCE 
Trade balance  I072  I130  850  854  I543  1563  I5I7  I496  I549  1337  828  IO  -700  -132I 
Export/import ratio  1.62  1.54  1.34  1.26  1.73  1.62  1.49  1.39  1.37  1.28  1.15  1.00  0.92  0.88 
EXPORTS FROM JAPAN to: 
EU I5  I14  I  58  I9I  237  258  3I6  394  562  572  562  72I  732  737  678 
Switzerland & Norway  8  7  8  II  9  IO  I7  lO  20  I4  I9  23  33  47 
us  98  134  I46  I65  202  197  248  313  372  454  503  547  605  685 
Rest of the world  I7I  2I5  244  303  299  354  43I  485  5I4  525  602  587  577  505 
Total world exports  39I  513  589  7I7  768  877  I089  1370  I478  I556  I845  1889  1952  1915 
IMPORTS TO JAPAN 
Total world import  1292  I724  21IO  265+9  2732  2849  3313  368I  3947  4243  4917  450I  4242  3751 
PHARMAC. TRADE BALANCE 
Trade balance  -90I  -1211  -I 52 I  -1942  -I964  -I972  -2224  -23II  -2469  -2687  -3072  -2612  -2290  -1836 
ExEortlimEort ratio  0.30  0.30  0.28  0.27  0.28  0.3I  0.33  0.37  0.37  0.37  0.38  0.42  0.46  0.5I 
Source: OECD World Trade Statistics, various issues. Note: Europe is EU-15 plus 
Switzerland and Norway. 
14 Table 4: 
Destination of  ~harmaceutical exports, ~ercentages 
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
EXTRA-EU EXPORTS FROM 
EU-15 to: 
Switzerland & Norway  11.3  12.7  12.8  12.4  12.5  13.2  13.2  13.9  14.8  13.4  14.4  13.6  13.0 
Japan  7.96  9.87  11.7  13.6  13.0  11.0  11.5  12.3  11.6  11.6  9.8  8.5  7.5 
us  13.1  12.8  13.2  13.1  13.7  12.3  13.5  14.6  14.0  15.1  16.0  16.7  19.6 
Rest ofthe world  67.6  64.6  62.3  60.9  60.8  63.5  61.8  59.2  59.6  59.9  59.8  61.3  60.0 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Extra-EU/Intra-EU exports  1.15  1.06  0.99  0.96  0.95  0.95  0.94  0.90  1.00  0.97  0.96  0.93  1.02 
EXPORTS FROM US to: 
EU-15  41.6  45.1  43.6  45.4  46.1  45.3  44.9  45.6  43.6  42.1  43.7  46.1  47.5 
Switzerland & Norway  2.81  2.86  2.97  3.54  2.21  2.33  2.05  2.81  3.23  6.57  3.58  2.6  2.3 
Japan  20.5  19.7  20.5  19.4  21.5  18.6  17.6  15.3  14.8  13.7  14.5  11.8  10.6 
Rest of  the world  35.1  32.3  32.9  31.7  30.3  33.7  35.5  36.4  38.4  37.6  38.2  39.5  39.6 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
EXPORTS FROM JAPAN to: 
EU 15  29.2  30.7  32.4  33.1  33.6  36  36.1  41  38.7  36.1  39.1  38.8  37.8 
Switzerland & Norway  1.96  1.37  1.39  1.58  1.15  1.13  1.53  0.72  1.36  0.93  1.01  1.2  1.7 
us  25.2  26.1  24.7  23.0  26.3  22.5  22.8  22.8  25.2  29.2  27.3  29.0  31.0 
Rest of  the world  43.7  41.8  41.5  42.3  38.9  40.3  39.5  35.4  34.8  33.8  32.6  31.1  29.5 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Source: OECD World Trade Statistic.s, various issues. Note: Europe is EU-15 plus Switzerland and Norway. 
In  1997,  the  industry  employed  in  the  EU-15  almost  475,000  people,  up  from 
slightly  less  than  400,000  in  1985.  The  share  of pharmaceutical  employment  in 
total  manufacturing  in  the  EU-15  has  increased from  1.52%  in 1985  to  1.94% in 
1997, compared to 0.94-1.27% in the US, and 0.91-0.98% in Japan
6
•  The share of 
pharmaceutical  value  added  in  total  manufacturing  has  increased  in  the  same 
period from  2.24% to 3.35%, compared to 2.28-3.39% and 2.65-3.46% in the US 
and Japan, respectively.
7 
Trends  in  R&D  spending  for  the  period  1986-1995  are  shown  in  Table  5.  The 
amount spent on R&D increased in all the three regions. The US rank first in terms 
6 
See EU Commission, 1997, and Panorama ofEU Industry (CD-ROM), 2000. 
7 
See also U.S.I.T.C., 1991  and 1999. 
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100 of both  R&D  spending  and  ratio  of R&D  to  production,  consolidating  their 
supremacy during the Nineties. In 1995, the ratio of R&D to production for the US 
was 4 percentage points higher than Japan and 5.5 points higher than the EU. 
Over the  last  fifteen  years,  both  the  value  of production  and  employment  have 
increased steadily in Europe, the USA and- to a lesser extent- in Japan  (Figures 
1 and 2). 
Table 5: 
R&D spending (millions of ECU) 
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
At current X-rate 
EU-15  3416  4034  4690  5352  6070  6474  6989  7181  7407 
United States  3954  3917  4436  5474  5357  6394  7163  8955  9329 
Japan  2073  2285  2748  3001  2810  3544  3918  4834  5216 
At PPP X-rate 
EU-15  3355  3969  4591  5252  6028  6365  6952  7231  7427 
United States  3621  4170  4891  5681  6418  7624  8703  9792  1037 
5 
Japan  1480  1684  1907  2157  2493  2921  3209  3183  3257 
At current exchange rate, as a % of production 
EU-15  8.3  9.1  9.3  9.6  10.1  9.5  9.4  9.5  9.4 
United States  11.3  11.5  11.9  12.3  12.7  13.0  13.7  14.8  14.6 
Japan  8.7  8.7  8.9  9.0  10.0  11.0  11.6  11.1  11.1 
Source:  OECD,  1998  (for R&D  expenses)  and  EU  Commission,  "Panorama of the  EU 
industry" (for data on production). 
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In the Nineties,  significant differences and increasing divergence across European
countries are observed, (Figures 3 and 4). The French industry  shows a steady and
considerable  growth and the non EU-4 counffies  -especially Sweden,  Ireland,
Netherlands, and Denmark-  literally take off, especially in the more recent years.
Conversely, Italy declines sharply in the early Nineties, while Germany slows
down in the last five years. With respect to its major competitors,  Europe  lags
l8I
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behind the US (and also Japan) in terms of value added and according to different
measures of productivity and competitiveness.  Figures I and 2 show that both
Production  Value and Employment  are higher in the EU-15 than in the US and
Japan. Notably, the EU-15 employment  in the industry has been roughly twice
higher than the US during 1985-1997.
Figure 3:
Production Value: EU4 and non-EU4
(Nace  244)
l9I
t
I
I
I
t
I
I
I
I
I
I
t
I
I
I
t
I
I
Fgure4:
Total Enfloyrsrt  ELl4 ad mrELJ4
0\re24)
Table 6 reports the share of pharmaceutical labour costs on total production  value
in the EU-15, the US, and Japan, along with individual  European countries. The
Table also reports the share of the value of other "non-labour" inputs. The latter
was computed by subtracting labour costs from the value added. Since value added
is equal to labour compensation  plus the compensation  to other "internal" factors of
production, we took this to be a measure of a bundle of inputs different  from
labow. Apart from physical  capital, in the pharmaceutical industry this measure is
likely to include R&D capital inputs. The Table also reports the share of total
value added (which is the sum of the latter two shares) on the value of production.
This provides a measure of the extent to which the industry relies on internallygenerated  inputs  vis-a-vis  inputs purchased from  third parties.  The shares in the 
Table are averages across 1992-1997 and 1986-1991. 
Table 6: 
Labour share and share of other non-labour inputs on production value 
~avg for 1992-1997 and 1986-199Q 
1992-1997  1986-1991 
Share of  Share of  Share of  Share of  Share of  Share of 
personnel non- value  personnel non- value 
costs  labour  added  costs  labour  added 
inputs(*)  inputs (*) 
EU-15  23.21%  16.58%  39.78%  24.92%  15.64%  40.56% 
United States  13.50%  57.55%  71.05%  15.58%  55.32%  70.89% 
Japan  12.57%  53.60%  66.17%  12.90%  53.31 o/o  66.21% 
Denmark  26.50%  26.99%  53.49%  26.99%  21.78%  48.77% 
Germany  33.11%  9.36%  42.47%  31.81%  12.00%  43.81% 
Spain  23.00%  14.33%  37.33%  27.73%  10.56%  38.29% 
France  18.87%  14.00%  32.87%  20.18%  13.22%  33.39% 
Ireland  10.69o/o  42.18%  52.87%  14.11%  33.06%  47.17% 
Italy  22.74%  13.99%  36.73%  23.46%  13.50%  36.96% 
Netherlands  18.43%  14.91%  33.33%  22.86%  11.18%  34.05% 
Austria  23.17%  17.80%  40.97%  Na  Na  Na 
Finland  26.44%  21.68%  48.12%  24.12%  25.14%  49.26% 
Sweden  18.42%  30.59%  49.01%  Na  Na  Na 
United Kingdom  21.69%  28.40%  50.09%  23.60%  30.23%  53.83% 
Na =not available 
Source: Our calculations from Eurostat data 
(*)Value of  non labour inputs computed as total value added minus personnel costs. 
21 The Table shows that the  share of labour cost in  Europe is  higher than in  the  US 
and  Japan,  and  this  is  stable  across  the  two  periods.  This  suggests  that  the 
European  industry  is  more  labour-intensive  than  the  US  or Japanese  ones.  One 
could argue that the higher share of labour cost in Europe may reflect higher labour 
cost charges.  In fact, there is no reason why this should be so compared to Japan. 
Moreover, the other two shares in Table 6 show that not only do  the US and Japan 
have a higher share of non-labour inputs, but also of value added as a whole.  The 
difference is indeed substantial, with the US and Japanese firms showing a share of 
about 65-70% compared to  40% in Europe.  This is suggestive of the presence in 
Europe of a relatively larger share of fringe companies that are specialised in low 
value  added  activities,  like  manufacturing  and  commercialisation  of products 
licensed from  other companies, or simply of low value added medical or medical-
like substances. 
These differences across the three regions prompted a deeper analysis of the factors 
Table 7: 
Decomposition of pharmaceutical growth -- contribution of labour, non-labour inputs and 
total factor ~roductivit! (TFP) (avg for 1992-1997 and 1986-1991) 
1992-1997  1986-1991 
N  HHH  HHHH ------------- ------------------- - --------- -·  ----- --· --·  ----------
Total  Labour  Non-labour  TFP  Total  Labour  Non-labour  TFP 
growth  inputs  growth  inputs 
EU-15  5.81%  0.14%  1.32%  4.35%  9.14%  0.62%  1.39%  7.13% 
United States  8.44%  0.40%  4.84%  3.20%  7.18%  0.31%  4.43%  2.43% 
Japan  4.71%  -0.08%  2.65%  2.15%  6.82%  0.04%  4.40%  2.39% 
Denmark  6.43%  1.77%  1.90%  2.76%  8.72%  0.72%  4.54%  3.46% 
Germany  2.25%  -0.49%  -0.74%  3.48%  7.74%  0.82%  0.89%  6.03% 
Spain  3.16%  -0.23%  0.97%  2.42%  13.36%  0.56%  1.66%  11.14% 
France  5.28%  -0.10%  1.30%  4.08%  9.61%  0.61%  1.43%  7.57% 
Ireland  22.89%  1.64%  11.62%  9.63%  10.40%  1.11%  2.68%  6.61% 
Italy  2.02%  0.22%  0.67%  1.12%  10.28%  0.49%  0.82%  8.98% 
Netherlands  11.94%  0.46%  3.93%  7.54%  8.46%  0.26%  -0.45%  8.66% 
Austria  1.93%  0.11%  0.94%  0.87%  Na  Na  Na  Na 
Finland  6.95%  2.53%  0.12%  4.30%  10.32%  0.31%  4.26%  5.75% 
Sweden  14.24%  0.80%  3.35%  10.09%  Na  Na  Na  Na 
United Kingdom  7.04%  0.05%  1.72%  5.28%  7.72%  0.66%  2.55%  4.51% 
Note: Contribution of labour and non-labour inputs was computed by the usual growth accounting 
procedure, notably g 5 = w L *gL + w K*gK + residual, where w L is the share of personnel costs~ 
production value and WK is the share of the value of non-labour inputs on production value.  e 
value of non-labour input is the difference between value added and personnel costs; g 5, gL, and gK 
are respectively the growth rates of production value, number of employees, and non-labour inputs. 
The residual, or TFP, is the difference between gs and the first two terms of this expression. 
Computations based on Eurostat data. that  may  drive  the  growth  of the  drug  sector.  Table  7  uses  Eurostat  data  to 
decompose the growth in production value in the three areas during 1992-1997 and 
1986-1991. We employed the typical growth accounting procedure, which divides 
the growth in sales into the part explained by the growth of its measureable inputs 
(typically labour and capital)- weighted by their cost shares- and the growth not 
8 
explained by the growth in the inputs.  In our analysis, we distinguished between 
the growth in labour employment and the growth in the non-labour inputs defmed 
as value added minus labour costs. 
From Table  7  first  notice that compared to the US  and Japan,  Europe fared  the 
highest  average  growth  in  the  value  of pharmaceutical  production  during  1986-
1991.  By contrast, the average growth of the European industry declines in 1992-
1997, while the US growth increases, and it overcomes the European rate.  Second, 
in both periods the growth of production in Europe is accounted for largely by the 
residual  total  factor  productivity (TFP).  In the  US  and  Japan,  in both periods, 
production growth is explained mostly by the growth in the non-labour input,  i.e. 
capital and R&D assets.  This suggests that not only is the European industry more 
labour intensive, but it  responds  less  substantially to growth in non-labour inputs 
like research or capital.  The industry in Europe responds mainly to  "exogenous" 
factors unrelated to the growth in these inputs. 
Table  7  also  highlights  some  specific  patterns of individual  European  countries. 
Most  notably,  there  is  a  fairly  pronounced  decline  in the  growth  of production 
value between the two period in Germany, Italy, Spain, and partly in France.  By 
contrast,  the  growth  rates  either  increase  or remain  fairly  high  in  the  smaller 
European  countries,  and  particularly  in  Denmark,  Ireland,  the  Netherlands,  and 
Sweden.  In the UK, the growth rate in production values remains around 7% per 
year. 
8 
See for instance Jorgenson 
23 Interestingly  enough,  in  all  the  European  countries,  whether  their  growth  is 
increasing  or not,  the  weights  of non-labour inputs  vs  TFP are  always  balanced 
towards  the  latter.  That  is,  irrespective  of their performance  in  the  more  recent 
years,  these  countries show the same pattern, notably that measurable inputs,  and 
particularly the growth in R&D or capital, do not translate directly into production 
growth.  The only exception is  Ireland,  which shows a remarkable annual growth 
(23%) in the  1992-1997 period.  This is  clearly related to the various peculiarities 
of the Irish economy which has started growing at bewildering rates during the past 
decade.  It is  also probably related to the well known pattern of domestic location 
of multinational corporations, lured by tax incentives.  It is  nonetheless interesting 
that not only is  Irish pharmaceuticals growing at  a very high rate, but this is  the 
only European country where the contribution to  growth by the  non-labour input 
appears to be rather substantial.  In short, Ireland seems to be the European country 
which  resembles  more  closely  the  patterns  observed  for  the  US  and  Japan. 
Whether this is because US drug multinationals increasingly locate in Ireland or for 
9 
other reasons is an issue that goes beyond the scope of  this Report. 
9 
Note that since we are using production value rather than sales as our measure for the growth of  the 
industry, the patterns that we  observe for  Ireland,  like for all  the other countries, reflect genuine 
increase in production activities in the country, rather than, for instance, mere invoicing in Ireland by 
multinational corporations for tax purposes.  Clearly, the increase in production in Ireland may reflect 
an  increasing investment in  the  region  by  multinational  firms  rather than  being growth  by  local 
companies. 
24 III.  The European and US Multinationals: Comparative Performance 
Large,  diversified,  multinational  corporations  play  a  crucial  role  in  the  drug 
industry.  In this  Section,  we  analyse  some  important  indicators  of performance, 
comparing the European and US largest companies. 
Despite  the  high  R&D  intensity  and  the  highly  skewed  distribution  of product 
market sizes, the concentration of the pharmaceutical industry is low, albeit slightly 
increasing, mainly as a consequence of  processes ofM&A (see Table 8). 
Table 8: 
Market Concentration in Selected Countries, Corporate Groups 
Corporate Groups 
Top 10  ......  __ .!op  __ 25 
1994  1999  1994  1999 
- - - - ---
UNITED STATES *  52.82  47.87  81.50  84.51 
JAPAN  38.38  37.25  64.18  63.65 
SWITZERLAND *  49.90  51.57  71.62  75.58 
AUSTRIA*  43.09  44.89  72.95  73.29 
BELGIUM*  43.54  48.36  75.82  78.86 
CZECH REPUBLIC *  48.79  44.64  69.46  69.09 
DENMARK  58.01  53.22  85.33  84 
FINLAND*  69.15  62.49  88.70  85.13 
FRANCE  47.88  52.2  76.38  77.99 
GERMANY*  34.97  38.35  61.79  64.9 
GREECE  45.71  47.62  75.01  78.91 
HUNGARY  65.34  58.91  86.83  86.48 
IRELAND  48.82  50.17  77.01  77.62 
ITALY*  44.18  44.68  70.06  73.19 
LUXEMBOURG  44.04  51.15  73.14  76.46 
NORWAY*  66.19  58.95  90.83  85.3 
POLAND*  39.82  36.72  68.77  63.27 
PORTUGAL  40.30  41.85  70.26  72.56 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC *  55.86  49.45  76.65  75.24 
SLOVENIA  81.35  72.6  94.23  92.05 
SPAIN  39.47  40.27  67.12  69.8 
SWEDEN*  68.02  56.87  88.22  82.49 
UNITED KINGDOM *  48.04  49.13  71.53  71.39 
Source: IMS International. * Including hospital sales 
25 The  low concentration of the  industry can be  explained by some  specific  features 
of its  competitive  dynamics.  First,  the  industry  is  composed by many therapeutic 
classes and by a wide range of technologies.  Second, the successful introduction of 
a new drug within a given class is generally the first  outcome of intense "races" to 
innovate,  in which first  mover advantages can be  not  long  lasting.  In general, any 
major  innovation  is  followed,  well  before  patent  expiry  and  generic  competition, 
by  both  product  and  process  innovations  by  competitors,  that  can  substantially 
erode the market power of the early innovator. Then, the expiration of the original 
patent  marks  a  significant  "market  shock",  with  generic  firms  and  products 
expanding  on  the  market.  Third,  the  degree  to  which  early  innovators  enjoy  an 
advantage  in  introducing  later major drugs  within  the  same  family  of molecules 
10 
tends  to  be  limited  . This, jointly with  the  coexistence of several  compounds  or 
variations  thereupon  targeted  to  the  same  pathology,  generally  hinders  the 
persistence of  dominant positions in any individual market. 
Data presented in Tables 9 and  10 show a marked process of globalisation within 
the industry. Table 9 covers the period from  1985 to  1998. The Table shows that in 
all  the  largest  markets  a  significant  reduction  of the  share  controlled  by  local 
corporations. Data presented in  Table 10 confirms this process of globalisation of 
the industry. Moreover, Table.10 shows the good performance of firms that belong 
to the core of the industry and are located in the US, UK,  France, Switzerland, and 
Denmark.  On the contrary, one can observe a declining pattern for German firms 
and  the  fall  of Italy.  Over  the  1990s  the  US  share  of the  world  market  has 
increased, driven by the growth of the internal market and by the control of  a larger 
share of  the European market. At the same time, Table 10 reveals that the European 
II 
multinationals as well have increased their market share in the US  . 
10 
Sutton, 1998; Bottazzi, Dosi, Lippi, Pammolli, Riccaboni, 2000. 
11 
For further details see Gambardella, Orsenigo, Pammolli, 2000. 
26 As  it  is  shown  in  Table  11,  the  headquarters  of the  largest  pharmaceutical 
companies are located in Western Europe and the US, and Japan. Both in 1989 and 
in  1998,  the  top  10  pharmaceutical  companies  in  terms  of worldwide  sales  were 
headquartered  in  either the  US  or Western  Europe.  While  no  Japanese  firms  are 
among  the  top  10  companies,  several  Japanese  firms  fall  in  the  next  tier of top 
12 
worldwide pharmaceutical sales  . 
Table  11  confmns the  good  performance,  as  measured  by market  shares,  of the 
largest  European  corporations  in  the  last  fifteen  years.  This  result  is  robust, 
especially  if one  considers  the  lower  size  and  rates  of growth  of the  European 
market vis a  vis the American one. 
This result is not disconfirmed by data on the distribution of the 50 top selling new 
chemical  entities  launched,  worldwide,  in  the  two  five-years  periods  1985-1989 
and  1995-1999  (see  Table  12).  Moreover,  Table  13,  which  shows  the  R&D 
expenditures and the ratio R&D/sales for the top  10  pharmaceutical corporations, 
suggests  that  the  R&D  intensity  of the  largest pharmaceutical  corporations  is  at 
least as high as that of  their American counterparts. 
However, two major qualifications must be introduced. 
First,  coming  back to  the  1989-1998  comparison of Table  11,  it  results  that  all 
European  companies  appearing  in  the  top  10  ranking  in  1999  have  had  to  go 
through a significant merger or acquisition in order to remain in the top  10, which 
is not the case for their American counterparts. 
Second,  data presented in the  second part of Table  12  indicate  that  the  sales  of 
major  innovative  products  by  the  US  multinationals  have  increased  more 
significantly than those of the European multinationals in the  1990s.  As  it  is  well 
known,  only  a very small  fraction  of the  patented  compounds  turns  out  to  have 
significant therapeutic and economic value.  Thus, New Chemical Entities (that is, 
12 
See USITC, 1999, p. 3-1; Gambardella, Orsenigo, Pammolli, 2000. 
27 drugs  whose active  ingredients have not been previously approved for  therapeutic 
use)  provide  the  most  relevant  indication of competitiveness  based  on  innovation 
capabilities.  On this,  it  is  important  to  notice  that  US  companies  have  gained  a 
clear and growing  leadership  in terms  of the  relevance,  as  measured by sales and 
geographical  diffusion of New  Chemical  Entities (NCEs)  launched  on  the  market 
place
13
• As it is shown in Table 12, the share in terms of sales ofNCEs launched by 
US corporations over the total sales generated by the first 50 NCEs on the market 
rises  dramatically  in  the Nineties to  reach almost  70%,  while  the  share of Japan 
falls  drastically.  Both the  Swiss  and  the  Europe's  share  rises  somewhat,  with  a 
significant increase of the UK and above all France, while Germany' share drops to 
3%.  In addition, Table  14  shows that in 1999 more than 80% of the total sales of 
the world top  15  drugs was originated by US companies, with a dramatic increase 
in  the  last  decade  and  a  corresponding  sharp  fall  of Japanese  and  German 
corporations. 
Finally, and this is  an important point, the portfolio of products held by European 
multinationals tends to be older than that of the US firms, which suggests that there 
are differences in research productivity in recent years (see Table 15). 
The  evidence  presented  in  this  section  can  be  interpreted  by  referring  to  two 
mechanims. 
On the one side, our results can be explained based on the evidences according to 
which  an  increasing  fraction  of major  new  drugs,  diffused  across  the  most 
important markets worldwide, has US origins, also thanks to the innovative output 
of some  of the  older "New  Biotechnology  Firms",  like  Amgen,  Chiron,  Biogen, 
Genzyme.  In  fact,  the evidence presented in this section shows that US  firms  are 
now the  dominant source of innovation and innovative drugs, with Europe lagging 
behind. 
\3 
See Council on Competitiveness, 1998. 
28 On the other side, especially as for the oligopolistic core of the industry, our results 
are explained by the strong differences in  absolute sizes and in rates of growth of 
demand  between  Europe  and  the  US.  As  we  already  pointed  out,  the  US 
pharmaceutical  market  has  grown  from  being  roughly  equal  to  the  European 
market at the beginning of the  1990s to almost twice as much in very recent years. 
In our analysis, we are unable to distinguish whether the growth of the US market 
in the 1990s stems from higher prices or it is a genuine growth in demand. The size 
of the increase suggests that it cannot be just increases in prices (even though there 
can be  some  of it  as  well).  In  other words,  the  restructuring  of pharmaceutical 
demand,  and particularly of the health care system,  in the US, has translated into 
demand growth, which has benefited mainly the US  firms.  In fact,  in spite of their 
multinational nature, the bulk of the sales of the US  and European firms  is still in 
their own markets (see again Table 11a vs.  11b).  It is therefore natural that the US 
firms have taken greater advantage of  the growing demand in their own country. 
29 Table 9: 
Market Shares in Selected Countries, b~  Nationality of  Cor~oration 
Change in share 
1985  1989  1998  1998-1989, 
per~~pt~g~_pQi_n!_~ 
USA 
USA  74.7  69.59  63.32  -11.38 
Japan  0  0.17  1.7  1.7 
Switzerland  8.7  8.64  7.84  -0.86 
EU-15  12.8  20.39  24.58  11.78 
Others  3.8  1.21  2.56  -1.24 
JAPAN 
Japan  76.4  79  78.36  1.96 
USA  8.7  8.22  8.34  -0.36 
Switzerland  3.3  3.56  3.55  0.25 
EU-15  5.6  8.88  9.63  4.03 
Others  6  0.34  0.12  -5.88 
GERMANY 
Germany  56.6  55.03  45.06  -11.54 
Others EU-15  12.8  15  19.67  6.87 
USA  17.8  18.03  22.13  4.33 
Japan  0.2  0.57  1.72  1.52 
Switzerland  9.3  7.67  10.36  1.06 
Others  3.3  3.7  1.06  -2.24 
UK 
UK  33.4  42.73  24.45  -8.95 
Others EU-15  17.2  19.03  23.75  6.55 
USA  35.3  28.44  32.13  -3.17 
Japan  0  0  0.94  0.94 
Switzerland  7  6.48  7.26  0.26 
Others  7.1  3.32  11.47  4.37 
FRANCE 
France  51.6  48.46  36.86  -14.74 
Others EU-15  20  23.72  29.25  9.25 
USA  20.6  20.17  24.03  3.43 
Japan  0  0.06  I  I 
Switzerland  6.7  6.71  7.76  1.06 
Others  1.1  0.88  1.1  0 
ITALY 
Italy  39.6  42.43  25.76  -13.84 
Others EU-15  27.8  27.34  32.36  4.56 
USA  17.6  19.32  27.09  9.49 
Japan  0  0.18  1.17  1.17 
Switzerland  9.4  9.1  12.62  3.22 
Others  5.6  1.63  1  -4.6 
SPAIN 
Spain  37  30.68  24.8  -12.2 
Others EU-15  32.6  38.14  39.98  7.38 
USA  15.3  16.8  23.55  8.25 
Japan  0.1  0.12  1.3  1.430 
Switzerland  12.2  11.59  9.39  -2.81 
Others  2.8  2.67  0.98  -1.82 
Source: IMS International. * Including hospital sales Table 10: 
___  '"_~!!~~~~-'f~p-~~-(~~rate  Groups, by  Nation~!Y__!)f  Corporation: Major Markets  ------
~  -- -- ---- ·--- .. ____  N~ti~n~.lityofCorpora~on 
Ma!:._k_et __  ~}apan Switzerland  EU-15  German~  UK  France  Ital;x  Sweden  Denmark  Netherlands  Belgium 
1985 
World  34.2  13.1  7.7  24.8  9.6  9.2  2.8  1.3  0.6  0.2  0.5  0.6 
North America  64.3  0.0  8.8  18.6  4.3  12.9  0.2  0.6  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.3 
Europe  19.9  0.0  8.5  44.5  18.1  10.6  7.9  3.5  1.5  0.5  1.1  1.3 
NNA  11.4  49.3  4.8  10.7  5.8  3.7  0.5  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.3  0.2 
Latin America  34.4  0.0  11.1  22.9  14.8  4.5  2.2  0.5  0.1  0.0  0.6  0.2 
1989 
World  31.2  15.7  10.1  24.7  9.6  7.4  3.2  2.1  1  0.4  0.5  0.5 
North America  62  0.1  5.2  24.7  14  8.8  0.2  0.5  0.5  0.2  0.2  0.3 
Europe  20.3  0.2  17.3  38.0  11.3  8.3  8.1  5.2  2.4  0.7  I  1 
NNA  11.1  51.7  6.6  10.2  4  4.4  0.7  0.2  0.4  0.1  0.3  0.1 
Latin America  30.9  0  15.9  22.8  5.7  12  3.3  1  0.2  0  0.6  0 
1998 
World  36.0  11.0  8.0  28.8  10.0  9.0  4.4  0.6  2.8  0.7  0.6  0.6 
North America  58.5  1.5  7.9  24.8  6.8  11.6  1.8  0.0  3.5  0.2  0.4  0.5 
Europe  25.4  0.9  9.6  45.3  15.3  10.2  9.8  1.8  3.7  1.7  0.9  1.5 
NNA  12.3  46.1  5.1  14.3  6.3  4.1  1.7  0.0  0.9  0.8  0.3  0.2 
Latin America  28.6  0.2  11.9  27.8  16.1  5.8  4.1  0.1  0.7  0.0  1.0  0.0 
1999 
World  39.0  11.1  7.7  27.8  7.3  11.9  6.1  0.5  0.7  0.6  0.6 
North America  60.2  1.9  7.6  24.0  4.8  14.9  3.0  0  0.3  0.5  0.5 
Europe  26.1  1.3  9.5  45.7  12.3  13.8  13.0  2.1  1.7  0.9  1.5 
NNA  14.4  45.8  5.1  15.4  4.6  5.5  3.8  0  0.9  0.4  0.2 
Latin America  29.6  0.2  11.7  26.7  12.1  6.6  6.7  0.2  0.1  0.9  0.1 
• Location of  Headquarters. Source: IMS International 
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II  A5IRA  SWE  (f)59  3590,8  51,6  2755,7  39,6  480,2  6,9  132,2  19 
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32 Nationality of  the Main 
Producer Corporation  • 
USA 
Japan 
Switzerland 
EU-15 
UK 
Germany 
Netherlands 
France 
USA 
Japan 
Switzerland 
EU-15 
UK 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Table 12: 
Top ~0  N<;:Es_ ~y  O~igi~  ~f  Corporation* 
Number ofNCEs 
1985-1989 
17 
20 
3 
10 
3 
7 
0 
0 
1985-1989 
41.49 
37.33 
2.91 
18.28 
6.53 
11.75 
0.00 
0.00 
Sales(%) 
1995-1999 
24 
3 
6 
16 
8 
4 
3 
1995-1999 
69.12 
3.92 
7.78 
18.54 
9.38 
3.33 
0.80 
5.03  France 
*  Location of  Headquarters. Source: IMS 
33 Table 13: 
Pharmaceutical R&D Ex~enditures,  T~harmaceutical  Coq~orations, 1999 
World  Pharma R&D Expenditures  R&D as %of 
Ranking  Company  Nationality . 
I999 
(US$m)  Sales 
.  --- - -- -- -- ----
I  Merck&  Co.  USA  I ,82l.I  Il.9% 
2  AstraZeneca  UK  2,I83  I7.1% 
3  GlaxoWellcome  UK  I,927.5  I4.6% 
4  Pfizer  USA  NA  NA 
5  Bristol Myers Squibb  USA  I,559  12.4% 
6  Novartis  SWI  1,801.3  16.1% 
7  Aventis  FRA  NA  NA 
8  Johnson&Johnson  USA  I,400  16.4% 
8  American Home  USA  1,389.9  I5.6% 
Products 
10  Roche  SWI  1,893.1  19.1% 
Location of  Headquarters. Source: Scrip League Tables. 
Table 14: 
World Top 15 Drugs, by Origin ofMain Producer Corporation 
Nationality of  the Main  Total sales,$  %  Total sales, $  % 
Producer Co!J!oration  *  million, 1989  million, 1999 
us  1697  47.94  11227  82.06 
Japan  1173  33.14  460  3.36 
Switzerland  0  835  6.10 
EU-15  670  18.93  557  4.07 
UK  243  6.86  557  4.07 
Germany  427  12.06  0 
France  0  0 
Sweden  0  0 
OtherEU  0  0 
Other non EU  0  0 
--- - ------- -- ----------- - -· 
Total  3540  100  13682  100 
Location of  Headquarters. Source: IMS 
34 Table 15: 
Recent Products' Contribution to Total Sales: Top 100 Global 
Corporations*, 1997 
USA 
Japan 
Switzerland 
EU-15 
0/o of Total 1997 sales from NCEs launched since 1988 
32 
29 
14 
16 
• Location of  Headquarters. Source: IMS 
Source: IMS 
35 IV.  R&D and Innovation as Sources of Competitive Advantages 
IV.l The Division of  Innovative Labour in Pharmaceuticals 
There  is  little  question  that  innovation  constitutes  one  of the  key  sources  of 
14 
competitiveness in this industry and it is a major determinant of market structure 
European companies, especially the big German and Swiss firms,  have been major 
innovators  in the  industry ever since  its  inception.  Fallowing World War II,  and 
also benefiting from the dramatic increase of support to of biomedical research and 
health  care  expenditure,  US  and,  more  recently,  also  British  companies  have 
progressively  challenged  the  leadership  of  Continental  Europe,  establishing 
themselves as  major innovators.  However,  the  innovative core of the  industry has 
been traditionally quite small and remarkably stable over time, with practically no 
entry until the mid-Seventies. 
The  emergence  and  stability  of such  innovative  core  was  a  consequence  of the 
nature of pharmaceutical R&D, which - until the mid-Seventies - was based on 
the  extensive  exploration  of chemical  compounds  and  on  incremental  structural 
modifications of drug prototypes, organised around highly structured processes for 
carrying out mass screening programs. These processes involved large laboratories 
and  highly disciplined  internal  organisational  procedures,  which became a  source 
of first-mover  advantages  and  of economies  of scale  in  research.  Through  the 
evolution of the  industry,  the organisational capabilities developed to manage the 
processes of drug development and delivery - competencies in the management of 
large scale, expensive, clinical trials, the process of gaining regulatory approval as 
well as marketing and distribution - have acted as powerful barriers to entry in the 
industry. Around this core, a large fringe of firms has thrived through imitation and 
14 
See  Gambardella,  1995;  Sutton,  1998;  Matraves,  1999;  Henderson,  Orsenigo,  Pisano,  1999; 
Bottazzi, Dosi, Pammolli, Riccaboni, 2000. 
36 generic  competition  after  patent  expiration  as  well  as  through  production  and 
marketing in local markets and product niches. 
The advent of the so-called "molecular biology" revolution since the mid-Seventies 
has introduced drastic changes in the relevant knowledge base, in the processes of 
discovery  and  in  the  organisation  of research,  with  the  emergence  of a  new 
technological  regime  and  new  technological  and  organisational  capabilities  as  a 
15 
key source of  competitive advantages  . 
First,  the  "molecular biology" revolution has opened up new opportunities for the 
discovery and production of new drugs.  At the same time, it has implied a radical 
shift in the knowledge base and in research procedures and methodologies, with the 
transition  from  quasi-random  screening  to  "guided  discovery"  or  discovery  by 
design.  Moreover,  the  importance  of publicly  generated  scientific  knowledge  for 
16 
industrial innovation has drastically increased  . 
These changes  have had major consequences on the  organisation of research and 
on patterns of division of innovative labour. New technological opportunities have 
made  it  possible  the  entry of new firms,  mainly  specialised suppliers of specific 
techniques and intermediate products to larger companies. Established corporations 
have experienced complex processes of adaptation,  absorbing the  new knowledge 
base  and  adopting  new,  academic-like,  forms  of organisation  of research,  which 
rely  crucially  on  the  development  of  dense  networks  of  collaboration  with 
universities,  public  and  private  research  centres  and  other  companies,  especially 
17 
New Biotechnology Firms (NBFs)  . Yet, they continue to represent the inner core 
15 
See  Orsenigo,  1989;  Gambardella,  1995;  Galambos,  Sturchio,  1996;  Orsenigo,  Pammolli, 
Riccaboni, 2000; Drews, 2000. 
16 
See Arora, Gambardella, 1994. 
17 
See,  among  others,  Arora  and  Gambardella,  1990,  Powell  et al.,  1996;  Orsenigo,  Pammolli, 
Riccaboni, 2000. 
37 of innovators in the industry. Only few of the new firms have succeeded in entering 
into such core.  The - largely sunk - costs required for discovery and development 
have increased sharply and - as  a consequence - barriers to entry have increased. 
Nowadays, an R&D project for a new drug is  likely to last 8-12 years, with a cost 
18 
in the range of US$ 350-650 millions  . Moreover, molecular biology and the new 
general-purpose  research technologies  of combinatorial  chemistry,  highthroughput 
screening,  and genomics,  have  increased firm-specific  economies of scope related 
to  knowledge  spillovers  across  projects  and  research  trajectories.  Finally,  large 
innovative  corporations  play a  crucial  integrative  role  across  different  bodies  of 
knowledge  as  well  as  providing  complementary  assets  in  clinical  development, 
regulatory affairs and distribution channels. 
Table 16: 
Shares in terms of  Number of Patents, by Location of Inventors 
Pharma%  Biotech% 
* 
Count!1  1978-1987  1988-1997  Total  1978-1987  1988-1997  Total 
Canada  0.98  1.54  1.40  0.97  1.93  1.67 
Switzerland  4.08  2.94  3.23  3.61  3.79  3.74 
Germany  18.22  12.80  14.17  13.03  10.03  10.85 
Denmark  0.59  0.80  0.75  1.43  2.35  2.10 
Spain  0.18  0.45  0.38  0.14  0.40  0.32 
France  7.38  9.69  9.11  7.18  6.98  7.04 
Italy  2.85  3.24  3.14  1.06  1.75  1.56 
Japan  15.02  13.64  13.99  22.21  17.06  18.47 
Sweden  2.02  2.18  2.14  2.07  1.07  1.34 
UK  8.59  7.73  7.95  7.12  7.85  7.65 
USA  40.08  44.98  43.74  41.19  46.80  45.25 
- ---- - ----- ...  ------------------------ ---- ----------
_,_,, 
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
* Location of  R&D Labs. Source: Our calculations on European Patent Office 
18 
See DiMasi, 1991. 
38 IV.2 The US as an increasingly preferred location for invention? 
This  section  provides  some  evidence  on  the  geographical  location  of  R&D 
19 
laboratories within the industry, by means of  patent data  . 
All  biotechnological  and  pharmaceutical  European  patents  (EPO)  for  1987-1996 
were  analysed.  The  total  number of patents applied for  between  1987-1996  that 
was found is 45,454. Patent micro-classes were created, to distinguish biotech from 
pharmaceuticals. Then, every patent was assigned to a given country of invention, 
by assigning to the country the share of  the inventors in the patent that were located 
in the country. Thus, for instance, if a patent has ten inventors, two of which from 
Italy and the others from  Germany, we assigned 0.2  to  Italy and 0.8 to Germany. 
The  vast  majority  of patents  were  produced  by  inventors  located  in  only  one 
country. 
Table 16 shows that, both in traditional pharmaceuticals and in biotechnology, the 
share  of patents  by  US  inventors  has  increased  in  the  1990s  compared  to  the 
20 
1980s.  The share of  Japanese and German inventors has instead declined.  France 
grows  and  overcomes  the  UK  in  pharmaceuticals,  but  not  in  biotechnology. 
Switzerland loses  shares  in  pharmaceutical~, but grows  slightly in biotechnology. 
In general, the relative positions of the US and the EU switch moving from biotech 
vs. pharmaceuticals. This suggests that the US have a comparative advantage in the 
newer biotech fields relative to more traditional pharmaceutical research. 
19 
As  it  is  well  known,  measuring  innovation is difficult and  no  single  indicator usually yields a 
satisfactory picture. It is important to emphasise that in this Report R&D and patents are not used here 
as indicators of, respectively, innovative input and output, but as broad indicators of technological 
activities. See Griliches, 1990. 
20 
EPO data might "overestimate" the patenting performance of  Europe and "underestimate" that of 
the US. Here however we are comparing shares over time, and hence this problem may be less severe. 
39 An equally informative picture is  provided by the  analysis of patent citations, by 
nationality  of patent  assignee.  Patent  citations  provide  a  better  measure  of the 
technological  and  economic  potential  value  of innovative  activities  than  patent 
counts. Citations can in fact be used as a measure of the importance or impact of 
inventions and as a proxy of knowledge flows among patenting institutions. Widely 
cited  patents  tend  to  be  "seminal"  patents,  i.e.  key  inventions  on  which  further 
patent must refer to.  Moreover,  high citations rates have been shown to  correlate 
with the economic value of patents. Thus, a high number of citations received by a 
given firm or country can be interpreted as  a measure of the quality and relevance 
21 
of  its innovative activities  . 
Data reported in Table 17 sharpen the results obtained by looking at patent counts. 
The US  dominance is  stronger both in pharmaceuticals and in biotechnology, and 
in both fields citations to US patents increased over the two periods.  The share of 
citations to US patents is higher than the share of counts in the earlier Table, which 
suggests that on average US  patents are relatively more important.  By and large, 
the share of citations for the European countries is similar or lower than the share 
of counts.  Only the UK shows a higher share for citations.  Germany, France and 
Italy all show a lower share for citations than for counts. Among the 25 institutions 
which have the largest number of highly cited patents,  11  are American, 3 each are 
British, Swiss, German and French, one is Japanese and one Danish.  Moreover, 4 
are first generation biotechnology firms, and four are universities or public research 
centres. 
21 
Jaffe, Trajtenberg, Henderson, 1993; McMillan, Narin, Deeds, 2000. 
40 Table 17: 
Shares in terms of Patent Citations, by Nationality of Assignee  * 
Shares of Citations  '  ,, - --~·- ..  ___________  ...._. ____  .... _  0-~------ .. - __ ,., ____ ....,. _________  .. ___  ,.~  ............. .......,.,_.... ..........  "~-·----
Pharma%  Biotech% 
'  '"' "'". ~- "  --~-"-~  '" "" -·-·-··-- " 
Country  1978- 1987- Total  1978- 1987- Total 
1988  1997  1988  1997 
Canada  1.21  1.55  1.45  0.83  1.65  1.32 
Denmark  0.91  0.87  0.88  1.45  2.73  2.21 
France  5.48  6.85  6.44  4.77  5.18  5.01 
Germany  12.86  8.59  9.85  7.58  6.87  7.16 
Italy  1.81  2.70  2.43  0.57  l.17  0.92 
Japan  17.37  12.36  13.84  16.56  11.77  13.72 
Spain  0.11  0.23  0.19  0.20  0.14  0.16 
Sweden  2.42  1.88  2.04  1.63  1.21  1.38 
Switzerland  4.02  2.98  3.29  4.17  5.12  4.73 
UK  9.48  10.98  10.54  8.08  8.57  8.37 
USA  44.33  51.02  49.04  54.16  55.61  55.02 
---------~------------------
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
ColJlorate Headquarters. Source: Our calculations on European Patent Office. Data cleared from self-citations at the country and 
firm  level. Source: European Patent Office-CESPRI database on European Patent Applications. 
Table  18  gives  information on the geographical  location of inventive activities by 
the 30 selected firms.  Table  17  shows that:  a)  On average, the  inventive activities 
of the  European  and  American  firms  are  more  internationalised  as  compared  to 
Japanese  corporations;  b) When they do  not  invent  in their own  country,  French 
and  German  companies  invent  in  the  US  - note  in  particular the  high  share  of 
biotech  inventions  in  the  US  by  German  companies  as  compared  to  pharma 
patents; c) the UK, but also the Swiss companies, do relatively little research in the 
their  own  country  as  compared  to  what  they  do  in  the  US.  Particularly,  Swiss 
companies do a lot of their biotech research in the US; d) the US companies do few 
biotech patents  in  European  laboratories,  compared  to  the  Europeans  in  the  US 
(7 .1% compared to generally higher than 10%  ). 
22 
22 
See Gambardella, Orsenigo, Pammolli, 2000 for further details. 
41 Table 18: 
Top 30 Pharmaceutical Companies Worldwide-- Share of 1987-1996 European Patents 
Invented b~  Assignee from Countr~  x in Region ~ 
Region of  invention 
Nationality  EU  EU  JP  JP  Other  Other  USA  USA  Total  Total 
of  Assignee· Biotech  Pharrna  Biotech  Pharrna  Biotech  Pharrna  Biotech  Pharrna  Biotech  Pharrna 
France (2)  86.6  84.8  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.6  12.4  14.6  100.0  100.0 
Germ. (5)  80.4  95.2  0.2  1.0  1.5  1.2  17.8  2.6  100.0  100.0 
Japan (4)  1.7  4.5  96.4  93.5  0.0  0.1  1.9  1.8  100.0  100.0 
Sweden (I)  66.0  88.9  0.0  2.1  23.6  2.3  10.4  6.7  100.0  100.0 
Switz. (2)  44.4  71.2  5.1  2.5  0.8  0.8  49.7  25.5  100.0  100.0 
UK(2)  76.7  54.1  0.0  0.0  2.0  0.9  21.3  45.0  100.0  100.0 
USA (14)  7.1  16.6  1.2  2.1  1.2  2.6  90.4  78.7  100.0  100.0 
Total  36.7  51.7  8.7  7.4  1.5  1.6  53.1  39.2  100.0  100.0 
·Location of  Headquarters. Source: Our calculations on European Patent Office 
All in all,  the  evidence presented in this section shows that the relative position of 
the  US  as a locus of innovation has  increased over the  past decade compared to 
Europe.  Moreover,  our  overall  picture  suggests  that  Europe's  performance  is 
comparatively worse in biotechnology. 
The aggregate picture, however, stems from differentiated trends across individual 
European  countries.  It is  also  important  to  notice  that  the  American  leadership 
seem to  derive  less  from  the  superiority of individual  corporations vis-a-vis  their 
European  counterparts  than  from  the  presence  of a  larger number of innovative 
companies.  This can be seen from the larger number of US companies within the 
top corporations, from the higher R&D intensity of the US industry as a whole and, 
indirectly,  from  the  data  examined  in  Section  II.  Moreover,  the  American 
advantage  appears  to  be  linked  to  the  more  pronounced  role  of  the  New 
Biotechnology  Firms,  and  the  universities  as  well,  to  research  and  innovative 
activities. 
42 IV.3  Collaboration  in  Research,  Markets  for  Technology,  and  Implications  for 
Competitiveness 
As  mentioned  previously,  the  molecular  biology  revolution  has  entailed  the 
adoption of new organisational  forms  of R&D,  in particular a higher reliance  on 
collaborations between firms, New Biotechnology Firms (NBFs) and universities. 
The  explosion of technological  opportunities  and  the  relevance of pure  scientific, 
academic research for innovative activities associated with the advent of molecular 
biology, has meant that no  individual firm  can now be able  to  control and master 
23 
internally all the knowledge required to discover and develop a new drug  . 
Coupled with the establishment of property rights on such knowledge, all  this has 
allowed the  emergence  and  development  of a vibrant  market  for  technology.  The 
ability to  access and make efficient use of such network of collaborative relations 
and of the underlying market for technology has therefore become a crucial source 
of  competitiveness. 
Our analysis confirms that in the Nineties collaborations have increased in all  the 
countries.  In  addition,  we  find  that collaborations have increased in the phase of 
24 
pre-clinical research relatively to the marketing stage 
On this, Table 20, based on the PHID database at the University of Siena,  unravels 
major differences  in  firms'  research  and  licensing  behaviour,  focussing  on seven 
major Countries (USA, UK, Switzerland, Germany, France, Italy, and Sweden) for 
1992 to 1998. 
The  indicators  presented  in  Table  20  are  defined  as  the  proportion  of projects 
licensed in and out in a given phase of the R&D process, over the total number of 
projects developed in collaboration. 
23 
Powell et al.,  1996. 
24 
See Gambardella, Orsenigo, Pammolli, 2000. 
43 More precisely, Lp!L, Ll-2/L, L3/L, Lr/L and Lm/L, indicate, respectively: 
•  the proportion of  projects that were licensed-in in Preclinical (Lp/L ), 
•  the  proportion  of projects  that  were  licensed-in  Phase  1-2  of Clinical 
Research (Ll-2/L), 
•  the  proportion  of  projects  that  were  licensed-in  Phase  3  of Clinical 
Research (L3/L), 
•  the proportion of projects that were licensed-during the Registration Phase 
(Lr/L), and, finally, 
•  the  proportion  of  projects  that  were  licensed-after  commercialisation 
(Marketing: Lm/L). 
Other indicators are then considered: 
•  the ratio of licensed projects to in house projects (L/H), 
•  the  ratio  of projects  licensed  in  Preclinical  to  the  projects  developed  in 
house(Lp/Hp),and 
•  the  ratio  of licensed out projects  in  R&D  to  projects developed in  house 
(LO/H). 
In synthesis, Table 20 shows that US firms have consistently over time the highest 
propensity  to  collaborate  in  the  pre-clinical  phase,  whereas  collaboration  in 
marketing remain significant in the European countries.  Furthermore, US firms act 
more  frequently  as  licensors (Originators) of new R&D projects as  compared to 
the other European countries, which are typically licensees (Developers). Based on 
Table 20  it is possible to distinguish very clearly the behaviour of firms located in 
Countries like Italy and, to a lesser extent, Sweden, that have a high propensity to 
license-in in  the  latter phases of the R&D chain,  from  US, UK and Swiss firms, 
that collaborate extensively also in the early stages of  the R&D process. 
44 Moreover,  as  it  is  shown  in  Table  19,  the  role  of "Originators"  of US  (and 
Canadian)  companies  is  linked  to  the  disproportionate  share  of licences  which 
involve - largely  as  licensors - NBFs,  universities and  other research  centres  as 
compared  to  the  other  major  European  countries  (with  the  exception  of the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden), and Japan. 
Table19: 
R&D Projt'ds, by Country and Type oflm1itution, 1.9'»-~ 
I...ealHmm  DBFs  UnivJinst 
R&DPnj:Us  ~lo.s!  <Aigimted  Ikveqm 
Ntm  Piqccts  Nm  ~  Ntm  ~ 
l.&\  82  1710  313  920  112  421  3051  27.43  26.78  45.79 
.qm  137  1413  3  15  33  ~  1498  37.12  21.16  41.72 
Gemmy  37  716  17  30  7  8  754  27.19  21.09  51.72 
Unikrl I<iryhn  14  379  29  118  17  22  519  39.11  23.89  36.99 
Fmro::  24  347  23  58  9  22  427  2553  19.44  55.04 
Switmiard  24  376  3  6  2  8  390  34.87  1436  50.77 
Italy  45  272  3  12  6  7  291  27.49  2027  5223 
Srain  31  161  3  2  3  167  46.11  1138  4251 
&uhl<lml  46  !54  0  0  2  4  158  16.46  4.43  79.11 
Onrll  7  16  32  95  8  13  124  20.16  33.06  46.77 
Nettularrls  10  49  8  46  2  2  97  928  30.93  59.79 
Belgium  10  76  5  11  3  7  94  15.96  45.74  3830 
IXmuk  3  32  5  36  2  2  ~  31.43  37.14  31.43 
Huryuy  2  23  4  18  4  8  49  24.49  6531  1020 
Israel  9  31  I  I  5  13  45  1556  17.78  (:f).67 
Aus1rnlia  4  9  8  24  6  9  42  11.90  19.05  69.05 
Aigmim  18  36  0  0  0  0  36  278  9722 
Finlan:l  4  20  1  3  0  0  23  21.74  26.09  5217 
Oa:hRqJ.  5  9  I  I  10  20  50.00  15.00  35.00 
Portugal  12  17  0  0  0  0  17  5.88  94.12 
Sv.edn  2  5  5  11  1  17  11.76  47.06  41.18 
Ireland  1  14  2  2  1  0  16  87.50  1250 
Others*  97  104  3  3  46  51  !58  2215  10.13  67.72  _, _______ -----------·  -----~-- ~-·  --· --------·-----·--·--- ---------·--·  -----·-
624  5969  467  1413  269  681  fOi3 
*ilim, Rusiia, Souh Afii'a, Olile, Cola-rOO,  lOOia,  All'llria,  Brn2il, Greece,  Mexiro, Ini:nSa, Mrnxx:o, ~  Poml, 
SI<M:nia,  Tukey,  Omia, Utvit, New Zealaxl,  TaMan,  Uruguay,  Mala)'sia,  Mmro, Peru, ~  Slowk Rqiliic, 
Venezuela,~  Hmg Kcng, .Joom, Naway, 1-aaguay, ~  Ukrnire. Score: PHID,lJnivt2sity ofSiena 
45 Table 20: Profiles of  R&D Behaviour, Selected Countries, 1992-1998 
N  H  L  .  --··  .~/!:!  -- ·- --- _L~-~2/L  L3/L 
·-- L,JL  - Lm/L  YHp  LO/H 
---~--~ 
USA 
1992  898  732  166  0.227  0.373  0.241  0.066  0.091  0.229  0.135  0.077 
1993  1132  911  221  0.242  0.416  0.24  0.063  0.086  0.195  0.154  0.09 
1994  1378  1104  274  0.248  0.453  0.219  0.058  0.078  0.193  0.176  0.096 
1995  1834  1497  337  0.225  0.454  0.22  0.06  0.083  0.184  0.148  0.11 
1996  2250  1832  418  0.186  0.474  0.206  0.074  0.086  0.16  0.152  0.123 
1997  2257  1743  514  0.295  0.475  0.202  0.078  0.09  0.156  0.266  0.178 
1998  2353  1763  590  0.336  0.489  0.206  0.069  0.087  0.148  0.244  0.255 
Switzerland 
1992  216  184  32  0.301  0.176  0.196  0.039  0.098  0.491  0.038  0.106 
1993  223  187  36  0.284  0.180  0.200  0.040  0.080  0.500  0.026  0.079 
1994  248  205  43  0.251  0.173  0.195  0.021  0.086  0.525  0.034  0.076 
1995  241  197  44  0.223  0.162  0.186  0.023  0.069  0.560  0.04  0.057 
1996  235  192  43  0.223  0.181  0.204  0.045  0.045  0.525  0.036  0.050 
1997  229  183  46  0.209  0.162  0.279  0.046  0.046  0.467  0.043  0.019 
1998  226  176  50  0.192  0.138  0.333  0.055  0.055  0.419  0.051  0.016 
UK 
1992  230  193  37  0.19  0.16  0.19  0.08  0.11  0.46  0.06  0.01 
1993  488  217  41  0.18  0.17  0.17  0.05  0.10  0.51  0.07  0.01 
1994  258  212  110  0.21  0.17  0.13  0.06  0.09  0.54  0.07  0.02 
1995  334  275  150  0.21  0.27  0.12  0.07  0.08  0.46  0.06  0.02 
1996  380  313  177  0.21  0.24  0.12  0.10  0.07  0.46  0.09  0.03 
1997  442  362  211  0.20  0.34  0.10  0.09  0.07  0.40  0.13  0.05 
1998  468  376  92  0.24  0.38  0.09  0.11  0.06  0.35  0.16  0.06 
Gcnnany 
1992  334  283  51  0.180  0.117  0.059  0.039  0.294  0.491  0.033  0.021 
1993  381  321  60  0.187  0.150  0.066  0.050  0.266  0.468  0.046  O.D18 
1994  419  353  66  0.187  0.121  0.060  0.045  0.272  0.502  0.039  0.017 
1995  461  361  100  0.277  0.130  0.060  0.060  0.230  0.52  0.065  0.027 
1996  488  363  125  0.344  0.152  0.056  0.064  0.240  0.488  0.104  0.033 
1997  476  339  137  0.404  0.167  0.065  0.065  0.226  0.477  0.139  0.038 
1998  482  326  156  0.478  0.198  0.064  0.083  0.211  0.444  0.209  0.043 
France 
1992  206  171  35  0.204  0.171  0.085  0.085  0.142  0.517  0.057  0.017 
1993  234  193  41  0.212  0.195  0.073  0.073  0.121  0.538  0.073  0.015 
1994  259  211  48  0.227  0.166  0.083  0.062  0.166  0.523  0.067  0.023 
1995  287  230  57  0.247  0.175  0.052  0.070  0.210  0.493  0.084  0.021 
1996  289  228  61  0.267  0.163  0.049  0.065  0.229  0.494  0.086  0.022 
1997  264  199  65  0.326  0.138  0.046  0.061  0.215  0.540  0.096  0.030 
1998  281  105  70  0.331  0.157  0.042  0.057  0.214  0.530  0.104  0.033 
1998  295  207  88  0.425  0.284  0.079  0.045  0.170  0.420  0.247  0.063 
Sweden 
1992  23  17  6  0.353  0.166  0.500  0.334 
1993  28  21  7  0.333  0.142  0.428  0.430 
1994  32  24  8  0.166  0.125  0.125  0.375  0.375  0.041 
1995  34  25  9  0.360  0.111  0.111  0.333  0.445  0.040 
1996  39  27  12  0.444  0.083  0.083  0.083  0.416  0.335  0.037  0.037 
1997  48  31  17  0.548  0.117  0.294  0.059  0.294  0.236  0.064  0.032 
1998  49  29  20  0.689  0.200  0.250  0.050  0.250  0.250  0.136  0.035 
Italy 
1992  103  70  33  0.471  0.060  0.091  0.030  0.151  0.668  0.055  0.014 
1993  125  83  42  0.336  0.048  0.071  0.023  0.214  0.644  0.048  0.012 
1994  150  102  48  0.320  0.041  0.062  0.020  0.208  0.669  0.019  0.019 
1995  168  Ill  57  0.513  0.035  0.052  0.070  0.193  0.650  O.D18  0.025 
1996  179  120  59  0.491  0.034  0.051  0.067  0.203  0.645  0.016  0.029 
1997  187  121  66  0.545  0.060  0.045  0.060  0.197  0.938  0.080  0.035 
1998  178  111  67  0.603  0.059  0.059  0.059  0.194  0.629  0.090  0.040 
Source: PHID, University of  Siena 
46 This is an important point, as it suggests that one major difference between the US 
and Europe is really the presence in the US of an industry of technology suppliers, 
both new biotechnology firms  and  universities.  In  short,  Europe  and  the  US  may 
not look too different if one looks individually at the  large drug multinationals; but 
they  do  look diffemt if one  looks  at  the  organisation of the  industry.  In the us 
there  is  not only a larger number of big  innovative companies,  but  also  a higher 
supply  of new  technologies  and  an  extensive  vertical  specialisation  between  an 
industry that is specialised in the "exploration" of new technologies and innovation 
25 
opportunities, and an industry that is specialised in their "exploitation". 
As  argued  by  several  authors,  this  organisation  of the  industry  can  be  highly 
conducive to innovation performance, as  it  exploits the  comparative advantages of 
26 
larger and smaller firms in the exploration and exploitation phases. 
Given this, the European research system need not only to be strengthened in terms 
of its ability to produce more and better research, but also to exploit its innovation 
potential  by  translating  this  potential  into  economic  performance.  For  example, 
today the biotech industry in the US is said to account for 10% of  the total US sales 
of pharmaceutical products, and to  have produced more than a hundred thousands 
27 
specialised jobs between  1984-1994 (on average seventy-five jobs per company)  . 
A  recent  study  estimated  that  in  California  biotech  companies  linked  to  star 
scientists  provided  a  sizable  contribution  in  terms  of  new  employment 
25 
See March, 1991. 
26 
See for instance Arrow, 1983; Arora, Fosfuri, Gambardella, 2000; Arora, Gambardella, Pammolli, 
Riccaboni, 2000. 
27 
See Scriabine, 1999. 
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•  In addition,  over the  past  10-20  years,  some of the  US  biotech 
firms  - e.g.  Amgen, Centocor,  Biogen,  Chiron, Genentech, Genzyme,  Immunex -
have become leading producers both in the US  and to a good extent abroad.  These 
companies produce a fair number of products,  some of which account  for  a few 
hundreds millions dollars in annual sales.  At the same time, as we shall see below, 
biotech and  similar companies  selling  drug  research tools  and technologies  are  a 
new  important  phenomenon  of the  US  industry.  Apart  from  providing  new 
contributions  in  terms  of industry  growth,  sales  and  employment,  the  rise  of 
technology  specialists  in  new  areas  witness  the  vitality  of this  process,  and  its 
potential  for  new  economic  spins.  Finally,  the  intensive  licensing  out  of 
technologies  or products  by  the  US  biotech  companies  and  related  technology 
suppliers is likely to imply a steady flow of revenues in terms of royalty rates.  This 
provides further accounts for the opportunities that can be created by the rise and 
growth of  a dynamic and innovative industry. 
In  sum,  the  creation  of an  active  European  industry  that  thrives  on  innovation 
opportunities is  likely to mean less for the fortunes  and the competitiveness of the 
established European pharmaceutical companies.  But it is likely to imply far more 
for the  growth,  the performance,  and the  vitality of the  European pharmaceutical 
industry and environment as a whole. 
In addition, Tables  19  and 20 confirm both the role of US  firms  as originators of 
new technologies and the  importance of the market for technology within the  US, 
as a powerful tool of  transmission of  knowledge across countries. 
Although domestic sources of knowledge remain important, companies tend to  get 
a large share of licences from the US, especially in the pre-clinical research phase, 
and much less so in downstream stages. 
28 
See Zucker, Darby, Armstrong, 1998. 
48 This reinforces  the  point that  the  US  feed  both  domestic  and  foreign  companies, 
while European and Japanese firms  tend to  tap North American knowledge, much 
more  than the  other way  around  and  even more than the  domestic  sources.  As  a 
result, rather than globalisation of research, we observe a process of concentration 
of research into North America. 
Related  important  evidence  comes  from  recent  ongoing  research  on  the  relative 
29 
perfonrmances of in-house vs.  licensed in R&D projects  .  Tables 21  and 22 show 
that licensed projects have a higher probability of success, and this is so for all the 
countries  and  phases  of clinical  trials.  At the  same  time,  US  companies  show  a 
higher probability of success in all the phases of clinical trials.  This  stems from  a 
higher  probability  of success  of in-house  projects,  while  the  US  probability  of 
success  from  licensed  projects  is  aligned  with  the  probability  of success  from 
licensed  projects  of companies  coming  from  any  other  country.  To  put  it  in  a 
nutshell,  participation  to  division  of  innovative  labour  and  to  markets  for 
technology  can  allow  companies  to  get  access  to  external  knowledge  and  to 
increase the productivity of their research.  As a result, markets for technology can 
smooth  the  competitive  differences  across  firms.  While  in-house  development 
implies a different probability of success for companies from  different nationality, 
in the case of licensed compounds the probability of success is not affected by the 
nationality of the  firms.  Internal  differences  in  competitiveness,  which  depend  on 
firm-specific  capabilities,  can  be  vanished  by  the  fact  that  companies  rely  on 
common  sources  of technology,  which  they  acquire  from  specialist  technology 
30 
suppliers. 
29 
See Arora, Gambardella, Pammolli, Riccaboni, 2000.  See also Pammolli, Riccaboni, Baio, 2000. 
30 
See Arora, Gambardella, Pammolli, Riccaboni, 2000. 
49 Coupled  with  the  observation  that  US  firms  have  higher  propensity  to  usmg 
licenses  than  European  or  Japanese  firms,  these  results  bear  some  interesting 
implications for the analysis of  competitive advantages in drug R&D
31
: 
i)  US  firms cumulate a higher ability of developing compounds in-house with a 
greater reliance on licenses, which is  a more productive mode of innovating. 
Thus, the US  competitiveness in drug innovation appears to be the "sum" of 
these two effects - better in-house capabilities and more effective use of the 
market for technology; 
ii)  European firms  lag behind their US  counterparts  in terms of their in-house 
capabilities  and,  moreover,  of the  extent  of their  use  of the  market  for 
technology.  Considering  that  licensed  compounds  have  a  higher probability 
of success,  this  implies  that  European  companies  should  rely  more  on  the 
market  for  technology,  in order to  partially  compensate  for  their  lower  in-
house capabilities. 
31 
See Arora, Gambardella, Pammolli, Riccaboni, 2000. 
50 Table 21: 
Licensing Agreements in R&D 
Out  In 
Preclinical  300 (62.4%)  132 (27.4%)  49 (10.2%) 
USA  Europe  Japan 
350 (73.4%)  USA  84.3%  50.0%  40.8% 
96 (20.1 %)  Europe  10.7%  41.7%  6.1% 
31  (6,5%)  Japan  2.3%  4.5%  34.7% 
Clinical III 
80  (45.5%)  57  (32.4%)  (2.1 %) 
USA  Europe  Japan 
98 (55.7%)  USA  67.5%  54.3%  33.3% 
52 (29.5%)  Europe  27.5%  38.6%  20.5% 
26 (14.8%)  Japan  5.0%  7.1%  46.2% 
Marketing 
478 (29.3%)  820 (50.3%)  331  (20.4%) 
USA  Europe  Japan 
503 (30.9%)  USA  42.3%  23.9%  31.7% 
763 (46.8%)  Europe  38.1%  56.1% '  36.6% 
363 (22.3)  Japan  19.6%  20.0%  31.7% 
Source: Our calculations from PHID, University of  Siena 
51 Table 22: 
-----
Success and Failure Rates of Licensed vs. In-House Drug Coml!ounds {*) 
Preclinical/Clinical I  Clinical 1/II  Clinical II/III 
.......... ---------'- --- ..  ·~  --- - ---------------
Failure  Success  Total  Failure  Success  Total  Failure  Success  Total 
Total 
In-House 
2038  1470  3508  355  1268  1623  428  698  1126 
(58.1)  (41.9)  (100)  (20.6)  (79.4)  (100)  (38.0)  (62.0)  (100) 
Licensed 
192  311  503  36  348  384  49  293  342 
(38.2)  (61.8)  (100)  (9.4)  (90.6)  (100)  (14.3)  (85.7)  (100) 
Total 
2230  1781  4011  391  1616  2007  477  991  1468 
(55.6)  (44.4)  (100)  (19.5)  (80.5)  (100)  (32.5)  (67.5)  (100) 
US firms 
In-House 
849  700  1549  108  528  636  126  254  380 
(54.8)  (45.2)  (100)  (17.0)  (83.0)  (100)  (33.2)  (66.8)  (100) 
Licensed 
129  198  327  21  195  216  22  136  158 
(39.4)  (60.6)  (100)  (9.7)  (90.3)  (100)  (13.9)  (86.1)  (100) 
Total 
978  898  1876  129  723  852  148  390  538 
(52.1)  (47.9)  (100)  ( 15.1)  (84.9)  (100)  (27.5)  (72.5)  (100) 
European firms 
In-House 
764  477  1241  176  433  609  189  279  468 
(  61.6)  (28.4)  (100)  (28.9)  (71.1)  (100)  (40.4)  (59.6)  (100) 
Licensed  35  60  95  10  74  84  19  73  92 
(36.8)  (63.2)  (100)  ( 11.9)  (88.1)  (100)  (20.1)  (79.9)  (100) 
Total  799  537  1336  186  507  693  208  352  560 
(59.8)  (40.2)  (100)  (26.8)  (73.2)  (100)  (37.1)  (62.9)  (100) 
Japanese firms 
In-House  327  202  529  55  235  290  89  134  223 
(61.8)  (28.2)  (100)  (19.0)  (81.0)  (100)  (39.9)  (60.1)  (100) 
Licensed  8  33  41  3  62  65  8  61  69 
(19.5)  (80.5)  (100)  (4.6)  (95.4)  (100)  (11.6)  (88.4)  (100) 
Total 
335  235  570  58  297  355  97  195  292 
(58.8)  (41.2)  (100)  (16.3)  (83.7)  (100)  (33.2)  (66.8)  (100) 
Source: Our calculations from PHID, University of  Siena(*) Drug compounds developed in-house vs acquired through licenses in 
Phase I, II, or III of  clinical research by the top 100 pharmaceutical corporations, worldwide. Percentages in parenthesis are 
conditional probabilities of  success and failure. 
At the end of this section it is important to notice that the potential levelling effect 
of  markets  for  technologies  notwithstanding,  the  access  to  the  network  of 
collaborations  and  to  the  market  for  technology  in  pharmaceuticals  is  not 
unrestricted.  Particularly, the  network of collaborative relationships itself tends to 
consolidate and to  become increasingly hierarchical.  Indeed, the  network has been 
expanding  over  time,  mainly  through  the  continuous  entry  of new,  increasingly 
52 specialised,  US  firms  collaborating  with  large  incumbents.  Despite  this  growth, 
however,  the  network  tends  to  consolidate  around  a  rather  stable  core  of 
companies. This core is composed by large incumbents and early entrants, who act 
as  integrators  of differentiated  and  strongly  specialised  fragments  of knowledge. 
This  suggests  the  existence  of first-mover  advantages  even  in  the  network  of 
32 
collaborations, which becomes increasingly difficult to enter as time goes by 
IV.4 Drug Research Tools: Another Largely US Phenomenon? 
The  state  of  European  competitiveness  in  pharmaceutical  innovation  is  also 
reflected  by  the  ability  of the  EU  industry  to  develop  and  participate  in  the 
development of the  new  R&D  tools and general-purpose technologies (GPTs) that 
have been  introduced  into  the  industry  since  the beginning of the  Nineties.  GPTs 
have  enabled increasing  levels of vertical  specialisation and division of innovative 
33 
labour in drug discovery, not differently from other high-tech industrial sectors  . 
During the  Nineties,  a set of generic  research technologies has  been developed  in 
biotechnology  and  pharmaceuticals,  from  polymerase  chain  reaction  (PCR),  to 
protein  structure  modelling,  rapid  computer  based  drug  assay  and  testing, 
recombinant chemistry techniques, drug delivery systems, chemical separation and 
purification  techniques  that  allow  researchers  to  screen  thousands  of potentially 
promising compounds. 
In short, the recent evolution of  research strategies and heuristics in pharmaceutical 
R&D  can  be  characterised  by  discerning  between  two  main,  coexisting  search 
regimes.  The  first  regime  is  based  on  biological  hypotheses  and  molecules  that 
tend  to  be  specific  to  given  fields  of application  (specialised technologies),  while 
32 
See Orsenigo, Pammolli, Riccaboni, 1998 and 2000. 
33 
See Helpman, 1998. 
53 the second regime is  characterised by the emergence of new generic tools (general 
purpose technologies). 
In the  case of specialised research hypotheses. and  molecules, the  characterisation 
of biological  targets  and  the  corresponding  design/experimentation  of each  new 
drug  tends  to  require  individual  analysis.  Lessons  learned  from  the  design  and 
experimentation  of  one  biological  hypothesis/molecule  cannot  be  immediately 
transferred to other biological domains, in order to  develop other classes of drugs. 
Conversely,  general  purpose  technologies  are  in  principle  applicable  to  multiple 
biological targets and diseases. 
As for this Report, it is important to say that the two regimes are characterised by 
different  investment and  risk profiles.  In  particular,  firms  specialised  in  general-
purpose research technologies have access to a larger market, both in terms of  areas 
of application  and  partnering  institutions.  At  the  same  time,  they  act  in  market 
segments  that  have  significantly  lower short-term risks,  R&D  costs,  and  capital 
34 
requirements compared with those existing for integrated, product oriented, firms  . 
Aggregate  data  for  the  three  major  research  technologies  of  combinatorial 
chemistry, genomics, and high throughput screening are presented in Figures 5 and 
6.  While  the  American  dominance  seems  to  be  indisputable,  in  the  last  years 
European companies from the UK and,  later on, from  Germany, have entered the 
industry.  In  particular,  German  firms  that  have  entered  the  industry  have  been 
moving  away  from  the  fully-integrated,  expensive,  and  risky  model  of the  first 
generation'  NBFs.  Instead,  they  have  focussed  on  the  development  of business 
models  based  around  the  provision  of  technology  services  and  intermediate 
outputs. 
While  these  evidences  could  reveal  a  basis  for  a  certain  degree  of technological 
specialisation  of European  start-ups  in  markets  for  technologies,  the  new  drug 
34 
See Casper, Kettler, 2000. 
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discovery  GPTs can quickly become commodities, with increasing levels of
substinrtion and price competition3s. For this reason, in order to evaluate the
sustainability of any sffategy of specialisation  in the new GPTs, it important to
notice that "to grow, platform technology  firms must move relatively quickly into
new technologies or towards discovering  their own targets for development using
patented technolory"36.
Figure 5:
Agreements in General Purpose Research  Technologies
(Combinatorial Chemistry, Genomics, Highthroughput Screening)
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" S"" Arora, Fosfuri,  Gambardella,2000.
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See Casper, Kettler,2000, p. 34.
55Figure 6:
Agreements in General Purpose Research Technologies, Shares 1991-2000*
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56V.  The Role of Competition 
Apart  from  leading  drug  multinationals,  and  some  new  biotech  or technology-
based companies, Europe fares  a large number of low R&D intensive, "national", 
small  pharmaceutical  companies.  These  operate  exclusively  in  their  protected 
domestic  markets,  and  are  characterised by low  R&D  and  capital  intensity,  and 
poor innovative capabilities. 
The  presence  of  these  firms  suggests  that  patterns  of competition  in  many 
European countries do not provide either a strong "carrot" or a strong "stick" (or 
neither),  favouring  the  adoption  of  innovation- and  international-oriented 
companies'  strategies.  On  the  contrary,  European  regulated  and  fragmented 
environments allow for the survival of  these producers. 
It  is  well  known  that  patterns  of  competition  and  firms  behaviour  in 
pharmaceuticals  are  influenced  by  institutional  variables,  like  the  structure  of 
health  care  systems,  price  and  product  approval  regulations,  and  legislation  on 
property  rights.  How  do  these  variables  influence  innovation  and  welfare  is  a 
difficult  and  controversial  issue.  The  literature,  however,  seems  to  converge  in 
argumg  that  competitive  mechanisms  associated  with  stringent  regulatory 
environments for the approval of new drugs and competitive dynamics on the final 
37 
markets tend to promote innovation in the pharmaceutical industry  . 
On this, it is important to notice that the significant role of the EU notwithstanding, 
healthcare  provision  and  legislation  in  Europe  is  the  responsibility  of individual 
member  States.  European  national  healthcare  systems  are  hugely  diversified  in 
terms  of the  way they  are  organised  and financed,  ranging  from  national  health 
schemes  funded  out  of general  taxes  (the  UK-Italy-Spain  model),  to  mandated 
personal  insurance  with  pluralist  providers  (the  Germany-France-Netherlands 
57 model). While "these variations reflect the different social values, ethics, and levels 
38 
of wealth  across  Europe"  ,  they  constitute  an  impediment  to  the  creation  of a 
unified  European market,  with  all  its  implied consequences - economies of scale, 
higher  competition,  etc.  Moreover,  they  are  likely  to  contribute  to  generate 
inconsistencies,  inefficient  uses  of resources,  uneven  standards  of medical  care, 
and distortions in the functioning of  markets. 
This Report does not review neither the specific barriers to integration that are still 
in  place,  nor  the  extensive  EU  legislation  aimed  at  creating  a  single  market  in 
pharmaceuticals,  with  special  reference  to  areas  such  as  patent  protection, 
biotechnology  inventions,  industrial  manufacturing,  product  testing,  market 
authorisations, labeling and advertising. 
Instead, based on specific empirical evidences, the Report focuses  on some issues 
that are directly relevant for industrial competitiveness, seeking to identify a set of 
criteria against which the definition of specific measures by member States can be 
judged. 
Given our interest on the low R&D intensive segment of the market, some features 
of the off-patent segment (more than 50% of the market) have been addressed, by 
means of an  extensive  comparative  analysis  of industry  structure  and,  moreover, 
the nature and intensity of competition preceding and following patent expiry.  F~ve 
major markets, characterised by strong differences in  terms of regulatory regimes 
and  generic  products  penetration,  were  selected  (USA,  UK,  France,  Germany, 
39 
Italy)  . 
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See Thomas, 1994; Danzon, 1996; Helms, 1996. 
38 
EUI, 1999, p. 46. 
39 
See Pammolli, Magazzini, Riccaboni, 2000. 
58 The  most  important  chemical  entities  whose  patents  expired  from  1986  through 
1997  have  been  selected,  coming  to  a  sample  of more  than  60  molecules  per 
country (with the exception of Italy,  for which only 20  molecules of known dates 
of patent  expiry  were  available).  A  broad  concept  of market  competition would 
involve  the  chemical  entity  and  the  market  composed  of therapeutic  alternatives. 
For this Report a narrower context, the chemical entity market, is used because an 
Original  drug  directly  competes  with  Multiple  Source  Drugs  (MSDs)  within  a 
40 
given chemical entity market  . In fact,  the.  relevant data set includes information 
on all Original and Multiple Source drugs in a selected chemical entity, permitting 
41 
inclusion of  all drugs within a chemical entity (generic name)  . 
Table 23  and Figures 7,  8,  and 9 present some descriptive results of the analysis. 
While we  not focus  here  on price comparisons  across  countries 
42
,  some relevant 
results for the analysis of  patterns of industrial competitiveness can be outlined: 
40 
When substitution laws allow pharmacists to substitute multiple source drugs for  the Original, 
substitution in the retail setting usually occurs within the same chemical entity, rather than among 
therapeutic alternatives. In addition, multiple source competition is primarily targeted at the Original 
rather than the therapeutic market. Therefore, effects of substitution among chemical entities within 
the broader therapeutically equivalent market are not taken into account. Price differentiation of  one 
dosage form versus another for a specific product is  not examined. Data are aggregated across all 
strengths,  dosage  forms,  and packing  sizes for  all  variables of each  drug.  Specific data  for  each 
manufacturer's sales in US dollars and number of units sold are pulled for each drug, strength, and 
dosage form. 
41 
Data sources for the  study  include:  the  IMS  Pharmacy and  Hospital  databases,  information on 
patent expirations, and a self-administrated questionnaire used to collect primary data on drug entity 
characteristics.  For  the  IMS  International  data  sets,  data  for  each  manufacturer's  sales  in  local 
currency, US dollars and number of units sold in five major countries (USA, UK, Germany, France, 
and Italy) were extracted. The data set includes quarterly data from the first quarter of 1986 through 
the fourth quarter of 1998. 
42 
See Danzon, 1996. 
59 a)  There  are  strong  differences  across  countries  m  terms  of extent  of generic 
penetration  (see  Table  23)  and  intensity  of competition  after  patent  expiry. 
Systems  that  rely  on  free  or  semi-free  prices  and  on  comptition-based 
mechanisms (USA and, since the exclusion of patented drugs from the reference 
pricing  system  in  1996,  Germany;  UK)  do  experience  a  significant  degree  of 
competition and mobility of market shares after patent expiry.  On the contrary, 
systems that rely on price fixing  (Italy, France) experience a significant degree 
of stability in firms market shares over time, irrespectively of patent expiry (See 
Figure 7). 
b)  As  it  is  shown  by  the  boxplots  representing  the  median  (black  bar)  and  the 
dispersion of price indexes relative to  products based on any given molecule in 
the 24 quarters that follow patent expiry (see Figure 8), systems that rely more 
on competition are characterized by the  introduction of low-price products.  On 
the contrary, systems that rely on administered prices are unable to replicate the 
performance  of private  markets  in  the  introduction  of appropriate  selective 
mechanisms and pressures on price levels. In fact, both a significant stability of 
prices over time and a lower variance of prices for products based on a given 
molecule at given points in time are observed. 
c)  As  it  is  shown  in Figure 9,  systems that  rely on competition promote a clear 
distinction between firms  that act as  innovators and firms  that act as  imitators 
after patent expiry. To put it in a nutshell, Original products can enjoy premium 
prices  and  exclusivity  profits  under  patent  protection,  and  face  fierce  price 
competition  after  patent  expiry.  On  the  contrary,  systems  that  rely  on 
administered  prices  nurture  strategies  of pre-emptive  brand  proliferation  and 
horizontal  differentiation by imitative  brand name  products  well  before patent 
expiry (as an extreme case, see the data on the Italian market in Figure 9). 
All  in  all,  these  findings  give  support  to  the  view  that,  irrespectively  of any 
difference  in  terms  of existing  fmancial  sources  and organisational  solutions,  the 
European environment should be characterised by a larger diffusion of innovative 
60 management methods 
43
,  and by higher levels of market-based competition, to begin 
with, in the off-patent segment of  the market. 
As  for  industrial  policy  and  competitiveness  issues,  an  increased  market 
competition  in  the  off-patent  segment  of the  market  can  contribute  to  foster 
efficiency  and  to  design  adequate  incentives  to  innovate  within  the  European 
environment,  promoting  patterns  of industrial  restructuration  and  selection  and, 
moreover, allowing higher prices and returns on investment for innovative products 
44 
that are still on patent  . 
Incidentally,  a  stronger  reliance  on  competition  mechanisms  would  induce  a 
restructuration of vertical relationships within distribution channels, targeting  drug 
distribution costs  as  an  important area for productivity gains.  In many European 
countries,  distribution margins  for  wholesalers  and  pharmacists  are  still  fixed  by 
law,  in  general  as  a fraction  of the  final  price.  A higher reliance  on competition-
based  mechanisms  and  regulatory  strategies  could  enable  the  introduction  of a 
higher  degree  of competition  within  distribution  systems.  In  particular,  together 
with  a  higher  reliance  on  negotiation  procedures  targeted  to  wholesalers  and 
pharmacists,  the  diffusion  of cost-effective  ways  of dispensing  drugs  could  be 
encouraged,  relying  on  mail-order  pharmacies  and  on  the  potential  gains  in 
productivity  that  are  associated  with  the  new  Information  and  Communication 
Technologies (ICTs). 
43 
See GAO, 2000. 
44 
See also Jacobzone, 2000. 
61 Table 23: 
Shares of  National Markets, by Segments (Local Currencies) 
UK  1995  %  1996  %  1997  %  1998  %  1999  % 
Total  3079925  100.0  3418347  100.0  3717642  100.0  4020721  100.0  4393304  100.0 
Original Brands  2054281  66.7  2244111  65.6  2354743  63.3  2479768  61.7  2710701  61.7 
Licensed Brands  295382  9.6  352663  10.3  443882  11.9  543888  13.5  637844  14.5 
Patent NA  224990  7.3  234525  6.9  242357  6.5  243468  6.1  254009  5.8 
Unbranded  505273  16.4  587048  17.2  676660  18.2  753597  18.7  790751  18.0 
Germany 
Total  16153087  100.0  17303736  100.0  17373555  100.0  18715431  100.0  20700206  100.0 
Original Brands  6616472  41.0  7115339  41.1  7345085  42.3  8247688  44.1  9370111  45.3 
Licensed Brands  2521735  15.6  2792930  16.1  2822032  16.2  3093478  16.5  3475739  16.8 
PatentNA  3059322  18.9  3201668  18.5  3082150  17.7  3164577  16.9  3243271  15.7 
Unbranded  3955558  24.5  4193800  24.2  4124288  23.7  4209689  22.5  4611084  22.3 
France 
Total  54116334  100.0  56464471  100.0  59441833  100.0  63165381  100.0  66307342  100.0 
Original Brands  30946406  57.2  31833518  56.4  32922120  55.4  35489372  56.2  37887996  57.1 
Licensed Brands  10521138  19.4  11596251  20.5  12812585  21.6  13695996  21.7  14338627  21.6 
Patent NA  9007638  16.6  9129428  16.2  9325357  15.7  9297699  14.7  9137431  13.8 
Unbranded  3641153  6.7  3905274  6.9  4381770  7.4  4682315  7.4  4943288  7.5 
Italy 
Total  9458883  100.0  10467499  100.0  11344110  100.0  12224672  100.0  13539132  100.0 
Original Brands  4503552  47.6  5018454  47.9  5470191  48.2  5850940  47.9  6566792  48.5 
Licensed Brands  2627876  27.8  2859136  27.3  3155605  27.8  3507939  28.7  3934993  29.1 
Other Brands  1287527  13.6  1485288  14.2  1603394  14.1  1717773  14.1  1883483  13.9 
PatentNA  985623  10.4  1044362  10.0  1042953  9.2  1069730  8.8  1070524  7.9 
Unbranded  54304  0.6  60259  0.6  71966  0.6  78291  0.6  83340  0.6 
Source: IMS International 
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Figure 7:
Market Shares after Patent Expiry, Selected Countries
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Figure 8:
Price Indexes after Patent Expiry, Selected Countries
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Figure 9:
Number of Products per Molecule, Selected Countries
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VI.  Institutional Determinants of Industrial Competitiveness 
The evidences discussed so far show, among other things, that North America has 
become  the  main  locus  of innovation  in  pharmaceuticals,  to  which  European 
companies turn to get knowledge.  This may have different implications,  and one 
may even suggest different readings of  this phenomenon. 
For example, it could be argued that the situation is indeed worrisome, in spite of 
the fact that the competitiveness of  the European industry in sales has not worsened 
as much as its competitiveness in innovation.  Advocates of this view could argue 
that it's only because of  the time needed to bring new drugs to the final market that 
Europe's  competitiveness  has  not  deteriorated  severely  over the  past  decade.  In 
fact, the analysis of  the dynamics on the R&D side reveals that the gap with the US 
is  becoming  large,  especially  in  biotechnology  and  in  the  most  innovative, 
globalised, profitable, and best selling drugs, i.e. at the frontier of  innovation. 
By contrast, one could argue that the problem may be not so severe for the larger 
European  companies,  as  long  as  the  more  internationalised  European  drug 
companies succeed in tapping the US  knowledge and get into the sources of new 
products and technological competencies overseas. 
In any case,  as  suggested by our earlier discussion on this point, the  problem is 
severe for  the competitiveness of  the European environment as a whole. 
In particular, the observed concentration of research and innovation in the USA is 
worrying  because  Europe  risks  to  be  relegated  into  the  fringe  of the  industry, 
surviving and even thriving through imitation, generics, marketing, but giving up a 
large  share  of the  value  added  and  becoming  dependent  on  the  USA  for  the 
development of  new products. 
Most  notably,  the  inability  to  develop  an  industry  of technology  specialists, 
coupled  with the  persistence  of a  fringe  of national  firms  which - especially in 
some European countries - are not innovative and protected from competition, can 
66 I 
ultimately  give  rise  to  a  system  which  may  loose  significant  opportunities  for 
growth as well as for promoting qualified, research-based employment. 
As  always  in  the  case  of sectoral  and  national  systems  of innovation 
45
,  several 
factors  have  interacted to produce trends like the ones we are  assessing here,  and 
these factors have acted at different levels.  Thus, especially if one examines these 
issues  in  terms of long run trends and perspectives,  one cannot underestimate the 
role of structural policies in education, science and technology, regulation, labour, 
patent  law,  taxation;  the  institutional  settings,  in  terms  of legal  and  financial 
institutions,  professional  bodies,  intermediating  institutions,  corporate  governance 
rules; the industry; companies within the industry. 
According  to  this  Report,  four  sets  of variables  are  particularly  relevant  in  the 
specific  context of the  pharmaceutical  industry:  1)  The  size  and  structure of the 
biomedical  education and research systems;  2)  Some  basic  institutions  governing 
labour  markets  for  skilled  researchers  and  managers,  as  well  as  corporate 
governance  and  finance;  3)  Intellectual  property  rights  and  patent  law;  4)  The 
nature and intensity of competition on the final market.  In the sections that follow 
we shall analyse each of  these issues in tum. 
VI.l Education and Research in Biomedical Innovation Systems 
There  is  little  question that the sheer amount of resources  devoted to  biomedical 
research in the USA in the post-war era goes a long way to explain the American 
leadership in life sciences. 
Both qualitative  and  quantitative  evidence  suggests  that  this  spending  has  had  a 
significant effect on the productivity of those large US firms that were able to take 
45 
See Nelson,  1993,  1996; Mowey, Rosenberg,  1993; Zysman,  1994; Mowery,  1997; Pavitt, 1998; 
Dosi, 1999; 
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advantage of it
46
• Public funding of biomedical research also increased dramatically 
in  Europe  in  the  post-war  period,  but  total  spending  did  not  even  approach 
American levels. As a consequence, and despite the existence of centres of absolute 
excellence,  the  overall  quantity and quality of scientific research lagged behind in 
Europe. In turn, this created a vicious circle, with a significant drain of human and 
financial  resources  from  Europe  to  the  USA,  which  has  contributed  to  further 
strengthen the American advantage. 
Jointly  with  the  levels  of funding,  other  factors  are  likely  to  have  played  an 
important  role.  In  fact,  the  institutional  structure  of biomedical  research  evolved 
quite  differently in  Continental Europe as  opposed to  the USA (and partly to  the 
UK).  First,  the  structure of the  funding  system and  the  strategies of the  funding 
agencies are crucially important. In the USA, most of the funding  is  administered 
through  the  NIH,  with:  a)  a  substantial  integration  between  the  production  of 
biological  knowledge  on  the  nature  and  mechanisms  of human  diseases,  clinical 
research,  medical practice, and the discovery and development of new therapeutic 
treatments;  b)  a  significant  support  towards  basic  or  fundamental  science  in 
universities  and  public  research  centres,  widely  disseminated  through  publication 
in  the  refereed  literature.  Moreover,  the  American  system  is  characterised  by a 
variety  of sources  of funding  and  selection  mechanisms,  which  complement  the 
role of the NIH and act - always starting from scientific excellence - according to 
different  allocative  principles 
47
•  All  in  all,  the  US  research  system  achieves 
efficiency through  competition among  research units.  At  the  same  time,  it  allows 
diversity to be explored and institutional flexibility to be achieved. 
In Europe, funding has tended to be administered mainly at the national level, with 
strongly  differentiated  approaches  and  wide  differences  across  countries.  This  is 
46 
See Ward, Dranove, 1995; Cockburn, Henderson, 1996. 
47 
See Braun, 1994; Mowery, 1998; Stokes, 1997, and Guston in Branscomb, Keller, 1998. 
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likely  to  have  hindered  the  development  of a  critical  mass,  especially  in  smaller 
countries. In many cases, resources have either been spread among a large number 
of "small"  laboratories,  or they  have  been  excessively  concentrated  in  the  few 
available  centres  of  excellence.  Funding  coming  from  the  various  European 
programmes  has  only partially changed the  situation
48
•  The  absolute  size  and  the 
higher degree  of integration of the  American  research  system,  as  opposed to  the 
fragmented  collection  of national  systems  in  Europe  constitutes  a  fundamental 
difference. 
Moreover,  biomedical  research  in Europe has  been less  integrated with teaching. 
At the same time,  within  medi~al schools in Continental Europe, medical research 
has had a somewhat marginal role as compared to  patient care,  inducing a hiatus 
between clinical practice and training in molecular biology . 
The  relevance  of the  research-teaching  nexus  in  favouring  high  quality  scientific 
research and  its  integration with  industrial  research  can hardly be  underrated.  In 
particular,  the  diffusion  of molecular  biology  into  general  training  in  many 
European countries is a relatively recent phenomenon as compared to the USA and 
it has  only recently become a standard part of the curriculum of pharmacologists, 
pathologists  and  medical  consultants.  Research  has  tended  to  be  confined  into 
highly  specialised  laboratories  in  universities  and  especially  in  public  research 
centres,  with  little  interaction  with  teaching,  medical  practice,  and  industrial 
research. 
Also  for  these  reasons,  large  European  companies  have  been  in  general  more 
sluggish in adopting molecular biology as compared to their American competitors. 
Particularly,  the  European  firms  have  remained  for  a  longer  time  more  closely 
linked to  the  cognitive and organisational procedures that governed research when 
chemistry constituted the main knowledge base. 
48 
Pavitt, 1998. 
69 This  has  produced  a  vicious  circle  that  has  made  the  entry  of  the  new 
biotechnology  companies  more  difficult.  In  the  first  place,  there  is  evidence 
showing  that  rates  of formation  of new start-ups  are  strongly correlated with  the 
strength of University  and  public  research  institutes  in  the  underlying  sciences 
49
• 
Moreover,  given  the  delay  in  the  adoption  of molecular  biology  by  the  large 
companies  in  Europe,  new  prospective  start-ups  lacked  an  essential  source  of 
survival and growth, through the establishment of collaborative agreements.  In the 
absence  of  such  competencies,  the  large  European  companies  turned  to  the 
American  scientific  and  technological  base  to  tap  and  absorb  the  new  requisite 
competencies  during  their catching-up  process.  Indeed,  the  evidence  produced  in 
this  Report,  as  well  as  several  studies,  show  that  large  European  multinationals 
have  tended  to  establish  agreements  with research  centres and  biotech companies 
in the USA rather than in Europe  5°.  Finally, given the fast rates of progress of the 
scientific  and  technical  knowledge, European start-ups would be  often pre-empted 
by American companies. 
In sum,  the  organisational  structure  and  the  internal  institutional  diversity  of the 
public research system in the USA has promoted (both in terms of incentives and in 
terms  of organisational  capabilities)  the  commercial  exploitation  of academic 
research,  mainly  through  the  formation  of  new,  specialised  companies.  The 
flexibility  of the  American  academic  system,  the  high  mobility  of the  scientific 
labour market and, in general, the social, institutional and legal context that made it 
relatively straightforward for  leading academic  scientists to  become involved with 
commercial  firms,  have  been  major  factors  in  the  development  of the  new 
51 
industry  . 
49 
See Zucker, Darby, Brewer, 1997 
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See Orsenigo, Pammolli, Riccaboni, 2000. 
51 
See Powell et al., 1996. 
70 The  willingness  to  exploit  the  results  of academic  research  commercially  also 
distinguishes  the  US  environment  from  Europe.  This  willingness  has  been 
strengthened since the  late  1970s and the  passage of the  Bayh-Dole Act,  and the 
resulting  role  of  universities  as  seedbeds  of entrepreneurship  has  also  been 
extremely important in the take-off the biotechnology industry  5
2
. 
In  contrast,  links  between  the  academy  and  industry  - particularly the  ability to 
freely  exchange  personnel  - have  been weaker in  Europe.  Indeed,  the  efforts  of 
several  European  governments  were  targeted  to  the  strengthening  of industry-
University  collaboration.  Thus,  one  observes  a  mushrooming  of initiatives  all 
across  Europe  aiming  at  establishing  stronger  links  between  industry  and 
universities and to encourage a more entrepreneurial attitude by universities, rather 
than the mobility of personnel or the ease for university researchers to establish or 
participate in companies. 
At  the  same  time,  policies  have  been  targeted  mainly  to  the  set-up  of specific 
organisational devices  to  manage technology transfer,  like  science and technology 
parks or other agencies for technology transfer.  These initiatives have taken a wide 
variety of forms and show a mixed record in their performance and it has been only 
in  very  recent  times  that  symptoms  of the  diffusion  of a  different  attitude  have 
emerged. In some cases, the presence of intermediary institutions has paradoxically 
increased the  distance  between University  and  industry,  introducing  an additional 
layer  in  the  relationship  instead  of creating  flexible  mechanisms  that  are  not 
burdened by all sorts of  bureaucratic structures and requirements. 
The  US  experience  would  then  suggest  that  a  flexible  environment  whereby 
academic  researchers can more easily move into the  development of companies is 
more conducive to the raise of new research-based firms  and to  the corresponding 
technology-based industry.  Yet, the US  system is  not immune from an important 
52 
See Mowery, 1998. 
71 shortcoming.  As  Paul  David  and  Partha  Dasgupta have  argued,  this  system  can 
53 
seriously  undermine  the  norms  and  rules  of "open  science"  The  latter  implies 
that  the  scientific  community  - unlike  the  community  of  profit-seeking 
technologists that operate in  firms  - diffuse their discoveries through publications 
and the  like.  The  system of open science has  for  many years been an  important 
determinant of the  diffusion of knowledge  in  industry,  and therefore ultimately of 
industrial growth. As the academic system turns to become far more secretive than 
in  the past, this virtuous circle can be severely hampered.  In the US  life sciences 
and biotechnology industry, the "privatisation" of knowledge has already become a 
senous Issue. 
The  desirable  situation  is  probably  an  intermediate  one  between  the  US  and 
European  system.  To  identify  the  specific  features  of an  institutional  mechanism 
that would enjoy the advantages of both systems, while minimising their penalties, 
is an issue that is beyond the scope of this Report.  Our goal here is to point out that 
while  the  US  system  can  have  interesting  implications  for  the  growth  of a 
technology-based  industry,  the  European  system  is  more  likely  to  be  able  to 
preserve the norms of openness in scientific research which would then nurture the 
very same technology activities that can give rise  to the growth of industries and 
firms.  Yet, we also note that while the US should take in serious consideration the 
contamination of academic norms, which can be produced by an excessive reliance 
on exclusive  licensing  agreements  between universities  and  firms,  Europe  should 
care  about  the  excessive  ties,  bureaucracy,  and  hierarchies  of  its  scientific 
institutions, both at the national and the European levels. 
53 
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72 VI.2  Financial  Markets,  Corporate Governance,  and  Labour Markets  for  Skilled 
Researchers and Managers. 
It  is  often mentioned that the take-off of biotechnology - and more generally - of 
pharmaceuticals in the US, both through the large established corporations and the 
new  biotechnology  firms  (NBFs),  owes  much  to  some  specific  institutions  and 
attitudes that are typical of the American environment and much less developed in 
Europe. These factors have to do with the structure of financial markets, corporate 
governance,  and  labour  markets  for  skilled  researchers  and  managers.  The 
development  of venture  capital,  for  example,  rests  critically  on  the  nature  of 
ownership  and  contract  law  typical  of the  US,  which  can  be  used  to  create 
sophisticated legal structures used to support risky new ventures. 
An  important  feature  of  the  American  institutional  environment,  which  has 
favoured the development of  NBFs and the fast restructuring of big pharmaceutical 
corporations, is the existence of an active labour market for scientists, technicians, 
and  managerial  experts  within  biotechnology.  For  example  one  firm  fails  or 
decided to shed competencies in one area, employees must be able to obtain similar 
employment without severe  loss  of salary  or status.  Top executives  at start-up 
firms typically come from  large pharmaceutical companies or University research 
laboratories.  These  often senior scientists/managers would hesitate  in making the 
move to a start-up if  the career risk of  doing so were large. 
Furthermore,  innovation  is  dependent  on  the  flow  of  knowledge  between 
University  labs,  start-up  research  firms,  and  large  pharmaceutical  firms.  While 
joint research projects, strategic alliances, and so forth,  facilitate this exchange of 
knowledge,  these  "network  externalities"  are  also  supported  by  the  rapid 
movement of scientists and technicians across firms. Thus, if the labour market did 
not  support  extensive  lateral  career  mobility  across  firms,  these  network 
externalities would be difficult to sustain. 
In  Europe,  the  organisation  of labour  and  company  law,  combined  with  the 
organisational  strategies  of most large  companies,  constrains  the  development of 
73 US-style active labour markets, and make it harder for companies to "hire and fire" 
personnel or rapidly cut non-performing assets. 
Moreover, though there is often some lateral movement across firms very early in a 
person's career, the vast majority of European employees build their own careers 
within one  firm.  Correspondingly,  the  structure of decision-making,  remuneration, 
and  career-paths  within  firms  differ fundamentally  from  common practice within 
the  United  States  or  United  Kingdom.  Career  paths  tend  to  be  well  specified, 
incremental, and based on rank hierarchies. 
This  structure  of large  company  organisation  works  quite  well  m  industries 
dependent  on  long-term  investment  strategies  in  relatively  stable  technologies, 
characterised by the diffusion of deep  skills throughout the  firm.  In particular,  it 
encourages the creation of tacit organisational knowledge throughout the  firm that 
enhances  flexibility.  However,  this  system  creates  fundamental  obstacles  to  the 
creation of high-risk technology start-up firms.  The risk of a <<jumping  ship» from 
an  established large  company (or - though there  is  less research in this  area - a 
prestigious University professorship) to a start-up firm is extremely high
54 
More  generally,  successful  research  in  high-technology  firms  requires  the 
recruitment of  scientists with highly specialised knowledge  5
5
• 
In  the  US,  this  problem is  partially dealt with through a market-based system of 
financial  institutions and through very strong financial  incentives,  typically stocks 
options. In Europe, this area is undergoing extensive change during the late  1990s, 
but  during  the  1980s  the  organisation  of the  European  financial  markets  and 
property rights law made stock-based financial systems difficult to implement. 
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74 It  is  commonly  believed  that  lack  of venture  capital  has  restricted  the  start-up 
activity  of biotechnology  firms  in  Europe.  There  is  little  question  that  venture 
capital played a key in role in facilitating the creation ofNBFs and of a market for 
technology in the USA. 
There are important institutional reasons why the venture capital market is so large 
in  the US.  First, very substantial private legal  competencies exist and,  due to  the 
«enabling» nature of ownership and contract law, sophisticated legal structures can 
be  used  to  support  risky  new  ventures.  These  include  the  high-powered 
performance incentives for managers and scientists discussed above.  Second, and 
probably most important, in the  United States the ownership of firms  is  primarily 
financial  in structure, and rooted in large capital markets (e.g. NASDAQ, NYSE). 
Conversely, in many European countries, the lack of developed capital markets for 
technology firms create important barriers for prospective venture capitalists. 
The  forms  of corporate  governance  and  the  structure  of labour  and  financial 
markets  are  therefore  likely  to  have  hindered  the  process  of adaptation  of the 
European  industry  to  the  technological  and  institutional  shocks.  However,  direct 
empirical evidence on these issues is not massive. Moreover, the relevance of these 
factors might tum out to be somewhat exaggerated. In fact, the observed difference 
in  performance  among  some  European  countries  may  have  more  to  do  with 
differences in institutional settings, drug price regulation mechanisms, the nature of 
the  scientific  system,  and  the  like.  This  suggests  that differences  in  the  nature  of 
corporate governance and in the structure of labour and fmancial markets may have 
been important but not decisive factors in shaping the patterns of  adaptation. 
Similarly,  as  far  as  venture  capital  is  concerned,  there  appear  to  have  been  in 
Europe  many  other  sources  of funds  (usually  through  government  programs) 
available  to  prospective  start-ups.  In  addition,  although  venture  capital  played  a 
critical role in the founding of US biotechnology firms,  collaborations between the 
new firms and the larger established corporations provided a potentially even more 
75 important source of capital.  This raises  the question:  could prospective European 
start-ups turn to established pharmaceutical firms as a source of  capital? 
As  noted  earlier,  European  large  corporations  have  collaborated  relatively  more 
with US  biotechnology firms.  Even in the absence of other institutional barriers to 
entrepreneurial ventures,  start-ups in  Europe might have been crowded out by the 
large  number  of US  based  firms  anxious  to  trade  non-US  marketing  rights  for 
capital.  Given  the  number  of US  NBFs  in  search  of capital,  European  firms 
interested  in  commercialising  biotechnology  had little  incentive  to  invest  in  local 
biotechnology firms. 
As  a partial  support to  this  interpretation,  in  several  European countries various 
initiatives by both domestic  and foreign  investors  to  launch venture  capital  funds 
were  attempted  in  the  Nineties,  with  mixed  success  so  far  and  often  ending  up 
investing  in  new  foreign  biotechnology  companies.  Conversely,  foreign  venture 
capital  firms  have  funded  some  of the  few  experiences  of successful  European 
NBFs. 
All  in all, the slow development of venture capital in  Europe seems to depend less 
on the lack of investors and funds than on the paucity of supply of promising start-
ups based on solid scientific research. 
VI.3 Protection of Intellectual Property Rights 
It  is  widely  acknowledged that  patents  are  a fundamental  incentive  to  innovative 
activities in pharmaceuticals and biotechnology  5
6
• 
Both the  U.S  and the majority of the European countries have provided relatively 
strong patent protection in pharmaceuticals. In contrast, in Japan and in Italy, until 
(respectively)  1976  and  1978,  patent  law  did  not  offer  protection  for 
pharmaceutical products: only process technologies could be patented. As a result, 
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76 Japanese and Italian (as well as Spanish) firms have tended to avoid product R&D 
and  to  concentrate  instead  on  finding  novel  processes  for  making  existing 
molecules. 
Similarly, the establishment of clearly defined property rights also played a major 
role  in  making  possible  the  explosion  of new  biotechnology  firms  in  the  USA, 
since the new firms  had few  complementary assets that would have enabled them 
to appropriate returns from the new science in  the absence of strong patent rights. 
In the  USA,  a tight appropriability regime in  the  biotechnology industry emerged 
quite  quickly,  for  example  through  the  Bayh-Dole  Act  in  1980  and  through the 
granting of very broad claims on patents
57
•  In Europe, the  scope for broad claims 
on patents  is  greatly reduced and usually process rather than product patents are 
granted. 
A  draft  directive  from  the  Commission  that  strengthens  the  protection offered to 
biotechnology  was  recently  approved  by  the  European  Parliament.  Still, 
considerable controversy surrounds this issue.  It is indeed worth stressing that too 
strong an appropriability regime may not be unambiguously beneficial, especially 
as it concerns publicly funded research. Increasingly, in the USA doubts are voiced 
by economists,  lawyers and industry analysts that the  diffusion of an excessively 
permissive attitude towards the granting of broad claims on patents might actually 
slow  down  the  process  of diffusion  and  circulation of knowledge  and  hence  the 
future rate of technological advance. However, it is also important to notice that the 
rationale  for  stronger protection  to  intellectual  property in  biomedical research  is 
not based, according to this Report, on the traditional argument that the concession 
of broad property rights is an incentive to the production of knowledge. Rather, the 
argument is based on the assumption that property rights would favour the creation 
of markets for technology and hence a faster and more ordered diffusion and use of 
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8
.  This argument is  however controversial  and  complex,  and cannot be 
simply  accepted  at  face  value  in  general.  Particularly,  as  we  noted  earlier,  the 
increasing  privatization  of scientific  knowledge  is  a  problem  of the  US  research 
59 
system  . 
VI.4 Degrees and Forms of Competition on the Final Market 
Since regulation and public intervention in pharmaceuticals pursue multiple goals, 
which  relate  to  both  health  and  industrial  policy,  the  history  of the  market 
regulatory regimes is characterized by a set of highly differentiated trajectories and 
patterns. 
Before  the  "managed  care"  revolution,  in  the  US  pharmaceutical  companies' 
returns  from  product  innovation  were  protected by the  low  bargaining  power of 
buyers. Moreover, unlike most European countries (with the exception of Germany 
and the  Netherlands) and Japan,  drug prices in the  US  have been unregulated by 
government intervention. 
Until the mid-1980s the overwhelming majority of drugs were marketed directly to 
physicians, who largely made the key purchasing decisions by deciding which drug 
to  prescribe.  Both  the  payers  and  the  ultimate  customers - patients - had  little 
bargaining power, even in those instances where multiple drugs were available for 
the  same  condition.  Because  insurance  companies  generally  did  not  cover 
prescription drugs (in 1960, only 4% of  prescription drug expenditures were funded 
by  third-party  payers),  they  did  not  provide  a  major source  of pricing  leverage. 
Pharmaceutical  companies  were  afforded  a  relatively  high  degree  of pricing 
flexibility.  This  pricing  flexibility,  in  turn,  contributed  to  the  profitability  of 
investments in drug R&D. 
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78 When  the  rising  costs  of prescription  drugs  benefits  have  driven  employers, 
.  .  60 
msurers,  and managed care plans to  adopt new measures of cost contamment  , a 
differentiated  set  of techniques  has  been  developed  by  the  new  buyers  groups 
(HMOs,  PBMs,  insurance  companies),  which  relies  extensively on private  funds 
and  market-based  techniques,  allowing  processes  of corporate  adaptation  and 
restructuring  in  marketing  and  distribution  channels  and,  moreover,  stimulating 
competition and, indirectly, incentivating innovation. 
Historically,  drug  prices  were  also  relatively high  in  other countries  that did not 
have  strong  government  intervention  in  prices,  such  as  Germany  and  the 
Netherlands.  In  the  UK,  price  regulation  was  framed  as  voluntary  co-operation 
between  the  pharmaceutical  industry  and  the  Ministry  of  Health,  under  the 
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation  Scheme (PPRS).  This  scheme  left  companies to 
set their own prices,  but  a  global  profit  margin  with  each  firm  was  negotiated, 
which was designed to assure each of them an appropriate rate of return on capital 
investment  including  research,  in  the  UK.  The  allowed  rate  of rate  return  was 
negotiated directly  and  was  set higher for  export oriented firms.  In general,  this 
scheme tended to favour both British and foreign R&D intensive companies, which 
operated directly in the UK. Conversely, it tended to penalise weak, imitative firms 
as  well  as  those  foreign  competitors  (primarily,  the  Germans)  trying to  enter the 
British market without direct innovative effort in  loco
61
.  In Japan, the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare used to set the prices of all drugs, using suggestions from  the 
manufacturer based on the drug's efficacy and the prices of comparable products. 
Once fixed, however, the price was not been allowed to change over the life of the 
drug 
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•  Thus,  whereas  in  many  competitive  contexts  prices  began  to  fall  as  a 
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79 product  matured,  for  a  long  time  this  was  not  the  case  in  Japan.  Given  that 
manufacturing costs often fall with cumulative experience, old drugs thus probably 
offered the  highest profit margins to  many Japanese companies,  further curtailing 
the incentive to introduce innovative drugs. 
The procedures for the approval of drugs have also played an important role.  For 
example,  there  is  now  widespread  recognition  that  the  introduction  of  the 
Kefauver- Harris  Amendments  in  1962  in  the  USA  had  a  significant  impact  in 
inducing  a  deep  transformation  of the  US  pharmaceutical  industry,  particularly 
through raising the cost and complexity of R&D. Partly as a result many US  firms 
were forced  to  upgrade their scientific  capability.  The adoption of tight  scientific 
procedures in clinical trials might also have pushed to develop earlier and stronger 
relationships  with  the  new  emerging  biomedical  community.  Similarly,  Britain 
appears  to  have  actively  encouraged  a  "harsher"  competitive  environment.  Since 
the early  1960s,  the  British system encouraged the  entry of highly skilled foreign 
pharmaceutical firms and a stringent regulatory environment also facilitated a more 
rapid  trend  towards  the  adoption  by British  companies  of institutional  practices 
typical  of the  American  and  Swiss  companies:  in  particular,  product  strategies 
based  on  high  priced  patented  molecules,  strong  linkages  with  universities  and 
aggressive  marketing strategies  focused  on local  doctors.  The  resulting  change  in 
the  competitive  environment  in  the  home  market  induced  British  firms  to  pursue 
strategies  aiming  less  to  the  fragmentation  of innovative  efforts  into  numerous 
minor  products  than  to  the  concentration  on  few  important  products  that  could 
diffuse widely into the global market. By the 1970s, the ensuing transformations of 
British firms had led to their increasing expansion into the world markets 
63
. 
Conversely,  the  less  successful  performance  of other  national  pharmaceutical 
industries  (like  Italy  and  Japan)  reflects  much  weaker  competitive  pressures  in 
domestic  markets.  In  these  countries,  the  combination  of patent  laws,  policies 
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80 surrounding  licensing  and  comarketing  agreements,  and  drug  pricing  and 
reimbursement  regimes,  produced  a  "soft" regulatory  regime  whereby  firms  had 
little  incentive  to  develop  world-class  product  development  capabilities,  and  in 
general  they  concentrated  on finding  novel  processes  for  making  existing  foreign 
or  domestically-originated  molecules.  Moreover,  in  these  countries,  firms  were 
usually  protected  from  foreign  competition  and  simultaneously  had  strong 
incentives to  license products that had been approved overseas.  Under this regime 
the  predominant technology  strategy for  pharmaceutical  companies  often  became 
the identification of  promising foreign products to license-in. 
On  this,  it  is  important  to  say  that  in  the  recent  years,  under  the  pression  of 
increasing  fiscal  constraints,  some  European  countries  complemented  their  price 
fixing  procedures  with  interventions  on  levels  of reimbursement,  delistings,  price 
cuts.  While,  according  to  the  available  evidences,  these measirres  have  tended to 
realize, at best, short-term savings and, in any case, they have not affected rates of 
growth  of expenditure  on  pharmaceuticals,  these  measures  have  introduced  new 
distorsions in the final markets 
64
• 
At the same time, in some European countries - albeit in different forms and speed 
-regulatory schemes have been changing towards an increasing reliance on market 
based  mechanisms.  This  trend  is  importa.  However,  firms'  strategic  orientations 
and organisational attitudes change slowly and tend to persist for long periods of 
time.  Equally,  the  development of competencies  and  innovative  capabilities  is  a 
long,  cumulative  and  difficult  process  that  does  not  respond  immediately  and 
smoothly to economic incentives. 
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81 VII.  Conclusions 
VII. I. Summary of the main results and issues 
The main results of this Report can be summarized as follows. 
a)  In the  1990s the  European industry has  grown  less  than the  US  industry. 
This stems from a deceleration of the growth of the industry in Europe, and 
an  acceleration  of  the  US  industry  growth.  The  restructuring  of 
pharmaceutical demand,  and particularly of the health care  system, in the 
US,  seems  to  have  translated  into  demand  growth,  which  has  benefited 
mainly the  US  firms.  Moreover,  in  the  US  (and Japan) the  growth of the 
industry stems to  a good extent from  the growth of its non-labour inputs. 
By contrast, these inputs contribute modestly to the growth of the  industry 
in  Europe,  whose  growth  is  accounted  for  largely  by  the  unexplained 
residuals  - viz.  by  factors  that  are  independent  of the  growth  of the 
measurable  inputs.  Our analysis  shows that,  plausibly,  the  growth of the 
industry in  Europe depends  to  a good extent on factors  other than R&D, 
capital or labour.  Not only is this saying that the growth of the industry in 
Europe is more "erratic" than in the US or Japan, but also that the growth 
in  capital  or  R&D  translates  less  markedly  into  sales  growth.  This  is 
probably not  independent of our earlier remarks about the  larger presence 
in the European pharmaceutical sector of firms or activities which are less 
dependent  on  internal  R&D  and  innovation,  and  more  on  external  inputs 
such  as  licenses  from  international  companies,  pricing  policies  or 
peculiarities  of the  public  health  care  systems  or  demand  in  individual 
European countries, etc. 
b)  These  trends  take  place  within  a  context  of marked  globalisation  of the 
pharmaceutical  industry.  Protection  on  local  markets  diminishes  and 
penetration  from  foreign  companies  increases  in  each  domestic  market. 
82 The  shares  of US,  British,  French  and  Danish  largest  corporate  groups 
increases  in  all  regions,  whereas Germany and Italy  lose  ground.  Market 
shares of  domestic corporations fall everywhere in domestic markets; 
c)  Our data  indicate  that the  sales of major innovative  products by the  US 
multinationals  have  increased  more  significantly  than  those  of  the 
European  multinationals  in  the  1990s.  Moreover,  European  big 
corporations seem to  lag somewhat behind in their ability to  produce and 
above all sell, new, innovative, best selling drugs. However, when we look 
at the number of the top selling new chemical entities (NCE) developed by 
the European and US firms, we find that the difference is not as big as the 
difference in sales. This might indicate that the European firms are facing a 
comparative  disadvantage  in  selling  their  new  drugs.  All  in  all,  the 
observed  differences  in  sales  growth  between  European  and  US  largest 
multinationals  during  the  Nineties  do  not  seem  to  depend  only  on 
differences  in  the  ability to  develop new breakthrough drugs, but also  on 
the observed difference in demand growth between the two areas. 
d)  Data  confirm  that  the  1990s  have  shown  an  acceleration  of  the 
competitiveness  of the  US  pharmaceutical  industry  as  a  whole  in  the 
innovation-intensive  segment of the  industry.  First,  the  leading  US  firms 
have a higher share of turnover based on recent products compared to the 
European firms.  Second,  the  US:  i)  have a higher share of patents in the 
new  biotech  fields  compared  to  "classical"  pharmaceuticals;  ii)  are  a 
preferred destination of research by the European companies as well. This 
latter point is  important.  It suggests that the leading European companies 
may reinforce the US advantage in biotech, as they nurture US rather than 
European scientific  base  and biotech companies.  This is  an  indication of 
the  existence  of path-dependent  effects,  or first-mover  advantages  - i.e. 
biotech started in the US, and this may produce persisting advantages over 
time. Not only the Swiss and UK companies have in their portfolios a high 
83 share  of biotech  patents  invented  in  the  US,  but  French  and,  to  some 
extent, German,  companies license  in  biotech patents generated in the US 
as well. 
e)  The competitive advantage  of the  US  companies  in  innovation relies both 
on  higher  internal  capabilities  and  on  a  higher reliance  on  collaboration, 
especially in the  pre-clinical stages of research and development. However, 
the US companies have:  i) higher probability of success during phases I, II, 
and III of the clinical trials when the new compounds have been developed 
in-house;  ii)  a higher share  of licensed  compounds.  Moreover,  we  found 
that: iii) the probability of success does not differ among US and European 
companies  when  the  compounds  are  licensed.  This  finding  suggests  that 
the US exhibit a more pronounced division of labour in the drug innovation 
process  between  large  companies  on  the  one  hand  and  small 
biotech/specialised firms as well as scientific institutions on the other. 
f)  The  US  advantage  and  the  emergence  of  a  process  of deteriorating 
competitiveness  in  Europe  have  been  emphasised  and  deepened  by  the 
advent of the molecular biology revolution. The competitiveness of the US 
system  seems  to  be  largely  related  to  the  extensive  exploration  of new 
technological opportunities. In fact,  one notable difference between Europe 
and the US  in  the  1990s  is  that while the  US  have become the  centre  of 
world basic  research  in  life  sciences  and have continued the  development 
of a new research-intensive industry in this  field,  Europe has been unable 
to  develop  and  attract  research  and  to  complete  the  process  of vertical 
specialisation in the most innovative areas of the drug sector.  Particularly, 
Europe  has  not  really  given  rise  to  a  full  fledged  industry of innovation 
specialist companies and technology suppliers like in the US.  In principle, 
the fact that Europe has been unable to give rise to a full  fledged industry 
of technology suppliers is not a critical problem for the competitiveness of 
the  firms  operating  in  the  final  drug  markets.  We  argued  earlier  that 
84 competitiveness  in  sales  may  depend  on  different  factors  from 
competitivenss in  innovation.  Moreover,  in a globalised industry such as 
this, companies may not need local technology suppliers, provided that the 
drug producers can tap the new technology sources in other markets.  The 
question however is whether all the European drug companies can tap such 
international sources of technology.  In addition, this Report shows that the 
presence  of a  local  industry  of  research-based  firms  and  technology 
suppliers is  critical because the industry is  by itself a powerful source of 
growth.  Other factors  appear to  be  linked  to  country-specific  variables, 
primarily,:  the  level of funding  of fundamental  scientific  research and the 
structure of the  biomedical research systems; the degree and the forms of 
competition  on  the  market  for  drugs.  Furthermore,  other  institutional 
factors  are  likely  to  have  played  an  important  role,  even  if here  the 
evidence  is  less  compelling:  some  basic  institutions  governing  labour 
markets  for skilled researchers  and managers,  company organisation  and 
finance; the levels of  patent protection; 
g)  The  above  findings  are  consistent  with  other  features  of the  European 
environment,  linked  to  the  "institutional  shock"  created  by  cost-
containment policies  in  a context of fragmented  institutions and rules.  In 
particular,  this  Report  shows that  there  is  too  little  competition  in  some 
European  countries  and  that  this  lack  of competition  tends  to  nurture 
inefficient positions  within the  industry.  Price  fixing  mechanisms  tend  to 
protect local firms  in domestic markets, allowing for the survival of infra-
marginal companies in  some European countries.  These are highly labour 
intensive  companies.  What  is  important  is  not  that  they  specialise  in 
marketing.  This  might  not  be  too serious  a  problem,  if companies could 
take  advantage of an effective division of labour with innovators  located 
elsewhere  - and  possibly  in  Europe.  On  the  contrary,  local,  marketing-
specialised  companies  might  even  be  able  to  exploit  their  specific 
knowledge of local markets as  an important competitive asset.  However, -
85 absent the implicit protection afforded by price regulation mechanisms- the 
benefits of such division of labour can only be reaped through much higher 
efficiency than it is shown by the vast majority of these companies, as data 
on productivity demonstrate.  Moreover,  if the  declining trend of the  share 
of marketing  agreements  vis-il-vis  research  agreements  persists  over time, 
many European companies might be  relegated into the  fringe  of the world 
industry.  In  any  case,  a deteriorating  innovative  performance  is  likely  to 
imply  lower growth,  lower welfare,  and  lower independence  of European 
countries. 
VII.2  Global  Competitiveness  in  Pharmaceuticals.  An  Interpretative 
Framework 
To  begin  with,  it  is  important  to  recognise  that  over the  past  decade  significant 
progresses have been made  both within  individual  countries  and  at the  European 
level  towards  the  introduction of stronger  competition,  the  strengthening  and  the 
re-organisation of  the research base, the creation of  capital markets, etc .. 
Some large European corporations appear to have  caught-up with their American 
competitors,  also  through strategies of external  growth.  In more  recent years,  an 
encouraging  dynamism  is  observed  in  countries  like  Germany,  France,  the 
Netherlands,  Sweden and Denmark, as  the  rate of creation of NBFs is concerned. 
These  changes  are  not  yet reflected  in  the  data on competitiveness, but certainly 
represent a motive for optimism. 
Moreover,  the  decline  in  European  competitiveness  in  pharmaceuticals  and 
biotechnology  is  not  a  homogeneous  phenomenon,  but  it  actually  results  from 
largely  heterogeneous  performances  of  individual  firms  and  countries.  To  a 
considerable  extent,  the  European problem  derives  from  the  deterioration  of the 
German and  Italian performance.  Conversely,  the  cases of the  UK, Denmark but 
also Sweden and Ireland, have to be considered as success stories. 
86 This consideration is  even more important, as  soon as it is  recognised that behind 
these  different  cases,  there  are  extremely  varied  motivations  and  policies.  For 
example,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  successes  of France  and  Ireland  derive  from 
radically  different  approaches.  Moreover,  recent  developments  in  German 
biotechnology  would  suggest  that  local  institutional  frameworks  can  be 
successfully  modified  and  adapted  to  the  requirements  of  the  technological 
regimes, without changing their fundamental character. 
Thus,  a definite and too detailed policy prescription fitting  all  European countries 
might be  misleading.  However, the  results  of this  report suggest some broad, but 
clear, policy implications: 
A.  Upgrading basic scientific research 
First,  to  the  extent  that  the  decline  of European  competitiveness  is  linked  to  a 
deteriorating  innovative  performance,  especially  in  the  new,  leading  edge 
technologies, efforts should be primarily devoted to the strengthening of innovative 
capabilities.  In  turn,  this  implies  a  fundamental  upgrading  of basic  scientific 
research. 
The crucial importance of the availability of a strong research base can hardly be 
underrated,  in  that  it  is  the  basic  pre-condition  for  strong  technological 
competencies,  industrial  dynamism,  and  also  for  the  efficacy  of other  policy 
initiatives aiming at  inducing institutional and cultural changes.  While it might be 
true  that  the  European  performance  in  science  is  comparatively  better  than  the 
technological and industrial performance, still the gap with the USA is  very large. 
Moreover, whilst the American research system (including Canada) is an integrated 
system,  highly  differentiated  and  pluralistic  within  a  common  framework, 
European science is composed of fragmented and relatively small national systems. 
Indeed, European research teams tend to  collaborate comparatively more with US 
groups and there is little question that North America constitutes the main attractor 
of human and financial  resources from all over the world, including Europe. Since 
the  dynamics  (and  the  economics  and  sociology)  of  scientific  research  is 
87 characterised by strong path-dependent effects and first-mover advantages, success 
breeds further success and divergence tends to increase rather than decrease. 
Strengthening  the  research  base  implies  not  only  increased  funding,  but  also 
introducing important changes in the organisation of research systems: for example 
and primarily: 
•  Realise  a  closer  integration  between teaching  and  research  in  biomedical 
sciences; 
•  Promote an integrated environment, in which a set of differentiated sources 
of funding,  which act  according to  alternative  allocative mechanisms  and 
principles, and compete for supporting absolute scientific excellence; 
•  Realise the constitution - on these principles - of an integrated European -
as opposed to a collection of small national or even sub-national - research 
system. 
B.  Favouring the integration between scientific and industrial research 
The results of the report show also that Europe has been facing severe difficulties 
in  exploiting  scientific  research  for  industrial  purposes.  On the  the  one side,  this 
and  other  complementary  analyses 
65 
reveal  that  the  American  pharmaceutical 
industry was able to gain extraordinary benefits from its research base, because of 
the fluid nature of the boundary between public and private institutions in the field. 
As  mentioned  previously,  the  relative  European  weakness  in  pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology,  and  biomedical  sciences  is  likely  to  depend,  primarily  - on  the 
smaller scale,  the  lower quality  and  the  organisation of scientific  research  itself. 
These  considerations  notwithstanding,  measures  can  be  taken  to  improve  the 
interaction  between  industry  and  basic  research,  both  at  the  level  of  large 
corporations  and through the  creation  of new  science-based firms.  As  previously 
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88 mentioned  in  the  report,  this  has  been  indeed  the  main  focus  of several  policy 
actions  taken  by  governments  and  local  authority  throughout  Europe.  However, 
these  policies  have  mainly  aimed  at  building  bridges  between  University  and 
industry  and  to  developing  financial  and  infrastructural  facilities  like  venture 
capital, science parks,  etc.  In practice,  these measures - important as  they are  -
appear  to  reflect  a  conceptualisation  of the  innovative  process  based  on  some 
version of the  so-called  linear model  and - as a consequence - to emphasise the 
aspect  of the  transfer  of knowledge.  Recognising  the  interactive  nature  of the 
processes  of  innovation  in  biomedical  and  pharmaceutical  research
66
,  more 
emphasis  should be given instead to  the problem of a  more direct  integration of 
different agents  and  fragments  of knowledge.  Thus,  measures should be taken to 
favour the  development of more direct linkages between universities and  industry, 
through  the  integration of research and teaching and the  development of markets 
for technology. 
C.  Strengthening industrial R&D 
Firms  remain  the  main  locus  and  engine  of  industrial  innovation.  Thus, 
strengthening  their  technological  capabilities  appears  as  a  crucial  priority  for 
European  competitiveness.  The  results  of this  report  indicate that rather than  an 
insufficient  investment  in  R&D,  European companies  lag  behind  their American 
counterparts primarily in terms of their capabilities to organise research according 
to  the  principles  dictated  by  the  new  technological  regime.  Moreover,  the 
persistence  of a  large  fringe  of non-innovative  companies,  which  survive  in 
domestic  markets  through  marketing  based  strategies  and  through  implicit 
protection, still characterises many European countries. 
Thus,  European  firms  should  improve  their in  -house research capabilities,  also 
using  in  a  much  more  systematic  and  efficient  ways  networks  of collaborative 
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89 relations with universities and NBFs and the market for technology. A major result 
of the  report  is  that  division  of labour  could  help  in  reducing  the  competitive 
differences  due  to  different  in-house  capabilities.  In  other  words,  a  division  of 
innovative  labour would  enable drug companies which  are  behind the  leading  US 
ones  m  organisational  capabilities,  and  innovation,  to  catch  up.  Similarly,  the 
markets  for  technology  and  division  of labour  can  support  firms  specialised  in 
marketing, provided they are able to  improve their efficiency.  However, leadership 
in  modem pharmaceutical  R&D  requires  the  development  of adequate  integrative 
capabilities,  i.e.  of competencies  in  co-ordinating  decentralised research activities 
and in identifying and exploiting complementarities and economies of  scope. 
D. Strengthening market-based competition within an integrated environment 
Besides  the  already  mentioned  problems  related  to  insufficient  connections  with 
science,  excessive  diversification  and  delays  in  adopting  the  new  organisational 
principles of pharmaceutical  R&S,  other factors  contribute to  explain why fewer 
European  corporations  have  adapted  successfully  to  the  molecular  biology 
revolution  and  why  such  process  is  taking  place  more  slowly  than  in  the  USA. 
These  factors  have  to  do  with the general  principles of organisation of corporate 
governance, financial markets, markets for skilled labour. 
More specifically, this Report shows that the decline of European competitiveness 
in  pharmaceuticals is  linked to  the persistence of a fragmented market and,  at the 
same time,  to  major "non-market" and bureaucratic failures in public intervention 
and price regulation attempting 
In  this  respect,  strengthening  competition  at  the  European  level  constitutes  a 
fundamental  pre-requisite  for  inducing  more  innovation-oriented  strategies  and 
higher efficiency of less innovative firms.  On the one hand, strong levels of patent 
protection  for  the  segment  of the  in-patent  products  should  be -guaranteed  and 
enforced.  On the  other hand,  National  Health  Authorities,  should  converge  on  a 
higher  reliance  on  innovative  management  methods  and  on  competitive 
mechanisms,  moving  away  from  schemes  excessively  based  on  administrative 
90 decisions and bureaucratic structures/rules in the regulation of the market. The off 
patent  segment  of the  market  and  the  distribution  system  could  constitute  two 
important test-beds for such a deregulation pattern for pharmaceuticals. 
Two general principles could help the achievement of a higher level of integration 
of the market.  First, a higher variety of schemes and  sources for the financing of 
healthcare  and  pharmaceuticals  could  be  promoted  in  all  European  Countries. 
Second, Governments could fix  reasonable levels of patients' copayment
67 
through 
the introduction of schemes analogous to incentive-based, open formularies, so that 
competition on the final market can be stimulated in ways that fully preserve equity 
and, moreover, national health policy goals and solutions 
68
. 
At the  end of this  Section,  it  is  important to notice that  the movement towards a 
regulatory  environment  based  on  an  integrated  set  of market-based  mechanisms 
will become even more crucial with the accession of Central and Eastern European 
Countries  (CEECs).  In  principle,  the  Enlargement  to  CEECs  can  contribute 
significantly to the competitiveness of the European Industry. In order for this goal 
to be realised, however,  an integrated regulatory and competitive environment has 
to be quickly designed and  implemented.  In particular,  in the absence of a higher 
reliance  on  market-based  competitive  mechanisms,  the  Enlargement  could  very 
easily lead  to  amplify  the  existing  distortions.  This  is  particularly true  given the 
financial pressure that the new Member States will experience and the tensions that 
would necessarily emerge between cost containment  issues and  the principle of a 
69 
free movement of  goods  . 
67 
See Newhouse, 1993. 
68 
See Jacobzone, 2000. 
69 
Incidentally, it is important to notice that, given the fact that it is unprecedented in its scale and the 
relative starting position of  the candidates vis a  vis existing members, in the case of  pharmaceuticals 
the  Enlargement  will  certainly  require  some  transitory  measure,  for  example,  in  the  form  of a 
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